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INTRODUCTION
In the course of administering a trust, it is not uncommon for a
trustee to employ the assistance of third parties in the management and
investment of trust assets. Trustees often enter into contracts with
banks, investment advisers, brokerage firms and investment management companies for services ranging from simple custodial functions to
the rendering of investment advice. (These entities will be referred to
generally in this article as “financial services institutions.”) Typically
these customer agreements or account applications or management
agreements (which will be referred to herein collectively as the “account
agreements”) contain a provision requiring that all disputes between the
“customer” and the financial services institution will be submitted to
arbitration.1 When issues arise concerning the accounts (e.g., allegations
of improper investing, negligent management, or improper disbursements), the beneficiaries of the trust may wish to sue the financial services institution in addition to the trustee or the trustee may implead the
financial services institution in a lawsuit brought by the beneficiaries
against the trustee. The financial services institution then seeks to compel enforcement of the arbitration agreement, but the trust beneficiaries
argue that they are not bound by the agreement because they did not
sign it. This article explores the degree to which these nonsignatory beneficiaries are bound by predispute arbitration agreements signed by the
trustee.
The arbitration agreements discussed in this article are “predispute
arbitration agreements.” A predispute arbitration agreement is an
agreement that is either a separate agreement or, more commonly, a
provision included in a broader contract in which the parties agree that
any dispute that arises in the course of their relationship will be submitted to arbitration rather than to a court.2 This article discusses these
1 For example, in Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Ventura, 907 So. 2d 1035 (Ala. 2005), a
case that is discussed extensively in this article, the account agreement that was signed by
the trustee provided as follows: “Any controversy arising out of or relating to any of my
accounts or transactions with you, your officers, directors, agents and/or employees for
me, or to this agreement, or the breach thereof, or relating to transactions or accounts
maintained by me . . . shall be settled by arbitration . . . .” Id. at 1038 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
2 See, e.g., id.
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agreements in the context of claims filed by trust beneficiaries against
financial services institutions. This article does not discuss another arbitration issue that is receiving increased attention – the question of
whether trust and will beneficiaries are bound by settlors’ or testators’
directions in the trust or will that they resolve all disputes with the trustees and personal representatives and among themselves by binding
arbitration.3
Part I of this article contains a brief description of arbitration, a
discussion of the use of arbitration in securities lawsuits (that is, suits
against brokerage firms and investment advisers), and an examination
of the authority of trustees to enter into predispute arbitration agreements with financial services institutions. Following this general discussion, Part II describes the few cases in which courts have determined
whether trust beneficiaries are bound by a predispute arbitration agreement signed by the trustee. Part III examines the theories used by the
courts in these cases. Part IV describes the flaws in the cases in which
the courts have refused to enforce predispute arbitration provisions
against trust beneficiaries and concludes that in most states trust beneficiaries will be forced to arbitrate. Part IV then explores the contours,
advantages and disadvantages of the type of arbitration in which these
trust beneficiaries will engage. The Conclusion examines possible solutions to the problems encountered when trust beneficiaries are forced to
engage in securities arbitration.
I. ENFORCEABILITY OF TRUSTEE PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS – THE BACKGROUND
A. Arbitration Generally
“Federal and state policies favor arbitration for its efficient method
of resolving disputes, and arbitration has become a mainstay of the dispute resolution process.”4 In arbitration, a neutral third party – the arbitrator (or a panel of arbitrators) – makes a decision after hearing the
3 For discussions of this issue see David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and
Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1027 (2012); S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust
Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1157 (2012); S.I.
Strong, Empowering Settlors: How Proper Language Can Increase the Enforceability of a
Mandatory Arbitration Provision in a Trust, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 275 (2012);
Erin Katzen, Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: Defining the Parameters for
Mandatory Arbitration of Wills and Trusts, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 118 (2011); Bridget
A. Logstrom, Arbitration in Estate and Trust Disputes: Friend or Foe?, 30 ACTEC J. 266
(2005); and ACTEC Arbitration Task Force Report (2006) [hereinafter “ACTEC Task
Force Report”] (on file with author).
4 Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 851 n.1 (Tex. 2013) (citing AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011); Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84,
94 n.48 (Tex. 2011); Ellis v. Schlimmer, 337 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2011)).
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arguments and presentation of evidence by the disputants. Most arbitrations are “binding,” in that there are very few grounds on which an arbitration decision can be vacated.5 Arbitration is similar to litigation in
that the decision is made by a neutral third party rather than by the
parties themselves.6 Arbitration differs from litigation in that it is private and the parties have control over the choice of arbitrator, the process, and the possible outcome. Typically, the parties choose to have
only limited discovery in the interest of saving time and money.
Arbitration is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)7 and
by various state acts.8 Section 2 of the FAA provides as follows:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
5 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides these limited circumstances in
which an arbitrator’s award may be vacated:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012).
In addition to these statutory grounds, some courts have vacated arbitration awards
on the ground that they are in “manifest disregard of the law.” See, e.g., McCarthy v.
Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, (2008) however, indicates
that this separate “ground” may really only be a description of the statutory grounds. Id.
at 585. For a discussion of the “manifest disregard of the law” theory in the context of a
securities arbitration, see Bear, Stearns & Co. v. Buehler, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1028-29
(C.D. Cal. 2000) aff’d, 23 F. App’x 773 (9th Cir. 2001) (refusing to find that an arbitration
award granted to investors was not in manifest disregard of the law even though the
investors’ only relationship with the brokerage firm was through their investment adviser,
who opened an account at Bear Sterns). See generally David Gaba & J. L Spay, Disregarding the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard under the Federal Arbitration Act, 17
PIABA B. J. 179 (2010).
6 In contrast, in a mediation, a neutral third party works with the parties to help
them fashion their own resolution. See Mary F. Radford, An Introduction to the Use of
Mediation and Other Forms of Dispute Resolution in Probate, Trust, and Guardianship
Matters, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 616 (2000).
7 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).
8 Most state arbitration laws are modeled after the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act (RUAA), which was promulgated by the Uniform Laws Commission (formerly the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, “NCCUSL”) in 2000.
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thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.9
“Commerce” is defined in Section 1 of the FAA as “commerce among
the several States.”10 As most of the transactions described in this article involve interstate commerce, the FAA will be the law to which the
courts most often look when deciding the enforceability of the predispute arbitration provisions that are a component of these transactions.
Arbitration is being chosen increasingly more often as an alternative method of dispute resolution in a variety of estate and trust matters.11 Those who favor arbitration praise it for generally the same
reasons that other forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) are
praised: it is efficient, private, offers more control to the parties, and is
less expensive than litigation.12 Proponents of the use of arbitration in
estate and trust matters point especially to the fact that the parties can
choose as arbitrators individuals who are experienced in trust and estate
matters, rather than rely on state court judges whose knowledge of this
area of the law is often quite limited.13 Critics argue that arbitration
denies access to the courts, due process, and the right to a jury trial.14
The critics of arbitration also worry about the “repeat-player syndrome,” which might cause arbitrators to favor large institutions (e.g.,
banks and brokerage firms) that repeatedly use their services.15 Another drawback to arbitration noted by the critics is that the report of an
arbitration award typically does not explain the basis for the decision
but rather only discloses the amount of the award.16 Thus important
9

9 U.S.C. § 2.
9 U.S.C. § 1.
11 See Katzen, supra note 3, at 118-19. Also of relevance to this article is the fact that
both the number of arbitrations and the amount at stake in arbitrations is showing a
steady increase in the banking and finance sectors. See Inka Hanefeld, Arbitration in
Banking & Finance, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 917, 922 (2013).
12 See Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 3, at 1181-82.
13 See Logstrom, supra note 3, at 266; see also Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes,
supra note 3, at 1184-85.
14 See Logstrom, supra note 3, at 266-67.
15 See S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L. L. 1, 85 (2008).
16 See Logstrom, supra note 3, at 267. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA), is a nongovernmental self-regulatory agency that has promulgated rules relating to the arbitration of dipsutes between customers and broker-dealers. See FINRA
Rules & Guidance, FINRA, [hereinafter, FINRA Rules] available at http://finra.compli
net.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=607. In FINRA arbitrations (discussed in the next section) the parties may jointly request an “explained deci10
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questions, such as those that arise in the cases described in this article
(e.g., the extent and nature of the duty owed by a broker-dealer or investment adviser to trust beneficiaries), are not discussed in publiclyreported judicial decisions and thus the evolution of the law and theory
in some areas of the law is thwarted.
B. Arbitration of Securities Disputes
This article examines relationships between trustees and the entities
and individuals hired by them to aid in the management and investment
of trust assets. The major players in the securities industry with whom
trustees and other customers deal are broker-dealers and investment advisers (although the cases described in this article do not always clarify
which roles the entities and individuals employed by the trustee are
playing).17 These two types of investment professionals are regulated by
different entities and are subject to different standards of care in dealing
with their customers and to different rules relating to the arbitration of
disputes with their customers.
A “broker-dealer” is defined as “a person or company that is in the
business of buying and selling securities – stocks, bonds, mutual funds,
and certain other investment products – on behalf of its customers (as
broker), for its own account (as dealer), or both.”18 Most broker-dealers
are required to be members of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a nongovernmental self-regulating agency that creates
and enforces rules for members based on federal securities laws and
manages dispute resolution for customer disputes with its members and
disputes among the members.19 Broker-dealers “are required to deal
fairly with their customers” and an “important aspect of a brokersion” for which they must pay an additional fee. FINRA Rule 12904(g) (Apr. 17, 2009).
But even an explained decision does not contain the analysis that appears in a typical
court decision. FINRA Rule 12904(g)(2) states, “An explained decision is a fact-based
award stating the general reason(s) for the arbitrators’ decision. Inclusion of legal authorities and damage calculations is not required.” Id.
17 These two categories have been referred to as “legal categories that tend to confound investors.” Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 701 (2010).
18 Brokers, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/brokers (last visited Oct. 1,
2015). The Securities Act of 1933 defines the term “dealer” as “any person who engages
either for all or part of his time, directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the
business of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by
another person.” 15 U.S.C. §77b (2012).
19 The background of FINRA as a dispute resolution forum has been described as
follows:
Until mid-2007, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(“NASD”) and the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) ran separate arbitration forums that handled a combined 99% of all securities arbitrations in the

Fall/Winter 2014] PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

279

dealer’s duty of fair dealing is the suitability obligation, which generally
requires a broker-dealer to make recommendations that are consistent
with the interests of its customer.”20
An investment adviser is an “individual or company who is paid for
providing advice about securities to their clients.”21 Investment advisers
are regulated directly by the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission
(SEC) or state securities regulators.22 Investment advisers are held to a
higher standard of care than broker-dealers. “An investment adviser is a
fiduciary whose duty is to serve the best interests of its clients, including
an obligation not to subordinate clients’ interests to its own.”23 In reality, the courts sometimes blur the distinctions between broker-dealers
and investment advisers and find that a broker-dealer also owes a fiduciary duty to the customer if the broker-dealer gives investment advice24
or has been delegated discretionary trading authority by the customer.25
country. On July 30, 2007, NASD and NYSE Regulation, including their respective arbitration forums, consolidated and formed FINRA.
Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. REV. 1174, 1177
n.22 (2010).
20 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS, at iv (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter SEC Study], available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf. Recently amended FINRA Rule 2111
provides in part that a “member or an associated person must have a reasonable basis to
believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or
securities is suitable for the customer, based on the information obtained through the
reasonable diligence of the member or associated person to ascertain the customer’s investment profile. A customer’s investment profile includes, but is not limited to, the customer’s age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment
objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and any other information the customer may disclose to the member or associated
person in connection with such recommendation.” FINRA Rule 2111 (May 1, 2014).
21 Investment Advisers, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/investment-advisers
(last visited Oct. 1, 2015). The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 defines an “investment
adviser” as “any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or
as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities. . . .” 15 U.S.C. §80b-2 (2015).
22 Registration with the SEC is required if the investment adviser has over $100
million in assets under management. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3aA(b)(i) to (ii). All other investment advisers must register with their state securities regulators. See id.
23 SEC Study, supra note 20, at iii. See discussion of an investment adviser as a
fiduciary in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963). For a discussion of the differences between these two standards
of care, see generally Laby, supra note 17.
24 See, e.g., MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
886 F.2d 1249, 1259 (10th Cir. 1989).
25 See, e.g., Indep. Order of Foresters v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 157
F.3d 933, 940 (2d Cir. 1998). For a general discussion of state-specific theories under
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In 2011, the staff of the SEC issued a report in which it recommended
that a uniform fiduciary standard be applied to all broker-dealers and
investment advisers who give personalized investment advice to retail
customers.26 In the cases discussed in this article, although the question
of the standard of care is implicit in the claims raised by the trust beneficiaries, the choice and application of the appropriate standard is one
that is relegated to the arbitrators.
As noted above, the SEC and FINRA play a major role in overseeing the securities industry. SEC and FINRA rules include required language for account agreements that contain predispute arbitration
provisions.27 FINRA also is the focal point of much of the dispute resolution that takes place in the securities arena. FINRA not only serves as
the rule-making body for its broker-dealer members but it also “operates the largest dispute resolution forum in the securities industry to
assist in the resolution of monetary and business disputes between and
among investors, brokerage firms and individual brokers.”28 FINRA
maintains a Code of Arbitration Procedure that governs the arbitration
which a broker-dealer may be held to have a fiduciary duty to its customers, see Angela
H. Magary, Theories of Involuntary Fiduciary Liability, 12 PIABA B. J. 29 (2005).
26 See SEC Study, supra note 20, at v.
27 FINRA Rule 2268 provides as follows:
(a) Any predispute arbitration clause shall be highlighted and shall be immediately preceded by the following language in outline form.
This agreement contains a predispute arbitration clause. By signing an arbitration agreement the parties agree as follows:
(1) All parties to this agreement are giving up the right to sue each
other in court, including the right to a trial by jury, except as provided by
the rules of the arbitration forum in which a claim is filed.
(2) Arbitration awards are generally final and binding; a party’s ability
to have a court reverse or modify an arbitration award is very limited.
(3) The ability of the parties to obtain documents, witness statements
and other discovery is generally more limited in arbitration than in court
proceedings.
(4) The arbitrators do not have to explain the reason(s) for their
award unless, in an eligible case, a joint request for an explained decision
has been submitted by all parties to the panel at least 20 days prior to the
first scheduled hearing date.
(5) The panel of arbitrators may include a minority of arbitrators who
were or are affiliated with the securities industry.
(6) The rules of some arbitration forums may impose time limits for
bringing a claim in arbitration. In some cases, a claim that is ineligible for
arbitration may be brought in court.
(7) The rules of the arbitration forum in which the claim is filed, and
any amendments thereto, shall be incorporated into this agreement.
FINRA Rule 2268 (Dec. 5, 2011).
28 28Arbitration and Mediation, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).

Fall/Winter 2014] PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

281

of disputes between investors and brokers (Customer Code) and between or among members of the industry (Industry Code).29 FINRA
publishes Dispute Resolution Statistics30 and keeps an online database
of Arbitration Awards31 that are available to the public free of charge.
While FINRA is only responsible for the resolution of disputes that involve its members (who are broker-dealers), it has recently opened its
dispute resolution forum to cases involving investment advisers.32 As
the FINRA forum is the forum to which most of claims described in this
article will be assigned, Part IV examines critical aspects of the FINRA
rules as they relate to the efficiency and fairness of securities
arbitrations.33
The cases discussed in this article were decided against the backdrop of heated public debate about the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements in financial services agreements. Prior to 1987, an
investor who used the services of a broker-dealer or investment adviser
could choose to arbitrate disputes that arose in the course of the relationship, but that investor was not required to do so. In 1987, in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, and in 1989, in Rodrigues de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, the Supreme Court of the United States
handed down cases which effectively held that predispute agreements
requiring investors to arbitrate disputes under the Securities Acts were
enforceable.34 Since that time, it has become a widespread if not uniform practice for broker-dealers and investment advisors to include
predispute arbitration provisions in their account agreements.35 In the
years following the Supreme Court decisions, proponents and opponents have vigorously debated the advantages and disadvantages of the
29 Code of Arbitration Procedure, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/code-arbitration-procedure (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
30 30 Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-andmediation/dispute-resolution-statistics (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
31 31 Arbitration Awards Online, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/arbitration-awards-online (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
32 32 Guidance on Disputes between Investors and Investment Advisers that Are Not
FINRA Members, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/guidance-disputes-between-investors-and-investment-advisers-are-not-finra (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
33 33 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987); Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989).
34 34 On July 17, 2014, FINRA announced the formation of a thirteen-member Arbitration Task Force “to consider possible enhancements to its arbitration forum to improve the transparency, impartiality and efficiency of FINRA’s securities arbitration
forum for all participants.” FINRA Announces Arbitration Task Force, FINRA (July 17,
2014), http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2014/P554192. See Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S., 242; Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 483.
35 35 See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Blomberg, Securities Industry Arbitrations:
An Examination and Analysis, 53 ALB. L. REV. 755, 757 (1989).
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proliferation of predispute arbitration agreements in securities transactions.36 Proponents of predispute arbitration agreements argue that such
agreements are contracts that are voluntarily entered into by parties
who choose to have their disputes resolved in a private forum.37 They
characterize the FINRA forum, with its SEC oversight, as being a transparent forum that ensures fairness and due process.38 Critics of predispute arbitration agreements argue that these so-called voluntary
agreements to arbitrate are hardly that, as these agreements are so prevalent in financial services institutions’ account agreements that it is virtually impossible to have any meaningful participation in the market
without signing one.39 Thus customers have little negotiating power
when entering into account agreements with broker-dealers and they
frequently have no knowledge of the predispute arbitration agreement
or its legal consequences.40 These critics also state that SEC oversight is
not adequate to ensure a fair process and that, while FINRA may offer
a lot of information about arbitrations, the privacy of the hearings and
the lack of explanation in the decisions gives little comfort that arbitrators are acting fairly.41 In 2010, as part of the massive financial services
industry reform effort, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act gave the SEC the power to prohibit predispute
arbitration agreements in customer services agreements should it find it
in “the public interest” to do so “for the protection of investors.”42 To
date the SEC has declined to do so.43 A bill introduced in 2013, the
36 36 For two sides of that debate, compare Gross, supra note 19, with Benjamin J.
Warach, Mandatory Securities Arbitration After FINRA Rule 12403(d): The Debate Remains the Same, 18 PIABA B. J. 109 (2011).
37 37 See Warach, supra note 36, at 118-19.
38 Id. at 122-25.
39 In a recent New York Times article, the author states “if you try to avoid brokers’
so-called predispute arbitration clause, you may have little choice but to stow your savings in a mattress.” Tara Siegel Bernard, Taking a Broker to Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/ your-money/a-closer-look-at-the-arbitration-process-for-investors.html
40 Warach, supra note 36, at 119.
41 Id. at 122-25.
42 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 921, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o and 80b-5).
43 The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), a voluntary association of securities regulators that views its role as “protecting consumers who
purchase securities or investment advice,” has urged the SEC to exercise its authority to
ban predispute arbitration agreements. About Us, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/aboutus/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2015); Letter from A. Heath Abshure, NASAA President, to Mary
Jo White, SEC Chair (May 3, 2013), available at http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/07/NASAA-Letter-to-SEC-on-Arbitration-and-Class-Action-Waivers.pdf.
This letter was prompted by FINRA’s decision to allow Charles Schwab to alter its preexisting arbitration agreements to include class actions waivers, which NASAA claims is
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Investor Choice Act of 2013, would have amended the Dodd-Frank Act
to expressly prohibit the use of predispute arbitration provisions in contracts between customers and broker-dealers or investment advisers.44
In addition, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, which is currently
pending in the 114th Congress, would prohibit the enforcement of
predispute arbitration agreements in “consumer disputes,” including
disputes between financial services professionals and their customers.45
Even if Congress or the SEC imposes a ban on predispute arbitration
agreements, such a ban would, presumably, not be applied retroactively
to those account agreements already in place. Consequently, rather than
engage in the debate about predispute arbitration agreements, this article explores the rights of trust beneficiaries in the context of such
agreements.
C. Trustees’ Authority to Enter into Predispute Arbitration
Agreements with Third Parties
An initial question that arises when discussing predispute arbitration agreements is whether a trustee has the authority to enter into such
an agreement in the first place. A trust is defined in section two of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts as “a fiduciary relationship with respect
to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is
held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of anin violation of FINRA rules. Id. A similar letter to the SEC chair was written by Senator
Al Franken and signed by 36 of his Congressional colleagues. See Press Release, Senator
Al Franken, Sen. Franken Leads Charge to Protect Consumers’ Rights Against Wall Street:
Urges SEC to Prohibit Forced Arbitration Provisions in Consumer Contracts (Apr. 30,
2013), available at http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2381. Additionally, the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association (PIABA) has urged the SEC to
enact rules that would prohibit predispute arbitration agreements between retail customers and broker dealers. Letter from Peter J. Mougey, PIABA President, to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, SEC Secretary (Dec. 3, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-titleix/pre-dispute-arbitration/predisputearbitration-11.pdf. PIABA is “an international bar
association whose members represent investors in disputes with the securities industry.”
About PIABA, PIABA, https://piaba.org/about-piaba (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
44 Investor Choice Act of 2013, H.R. 2998, 113th Cong. §§ 3, 4 (2013). The 113th
Congress did not act on this bill. One critic of this bill argues that the bill
would destroy the existing fair, well-functioning dispute resolution process by
turning it into a lawyers’ free-for-all, driven by strategic gamesmanship rather
than common sense. The bill would give investors the unilateral right after a
dispute arises to force firms into either court or arbitration, or perhaps even
both at the same time, depending on where the client’s lawyer thought he or she
could extract the biggest payday.
Kevin Carroll, Ending Mandatory Arbitration Will Hurt Investors, SIFMA (Sept. 23,
2013), available at http://www.sifma.org/blog/ending-mandatory-arbitration-will-hurt-individual-investors/.
45 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. § 402(a) (2015).
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other person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention
to create it.”46 A trust does not exist unless there is trust property47 and
the trustee of a trust is “under a duty to deal with the trust property for
[the beneficiary’s] benefit in accordance with the terms of the trust and
can be compelled by the beneficiary to perform this duty.”48
Implicit in the notion that a trustee has the duty to deal with the
trust property is the concept that a trustee must be given the powers
necessary to do so. A trust instrument may grant a trustee broad or
narrow powers, grant only specified powers, or expressly prohibit the
trustee from engaging in certain actions.49 More recently, state statutes
grant all trustees broad administrative and management powers unless
the settlor restricts these powers in the trust instrument; for example,
section 815(a) of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC)50 gives trustees very
broad powers, described as “all powers over the trust property which an
unmarried competent owner has over individually owned property.”51
In exercising the powers, it is generally agreed that a trustee is not acting as an agent of the trust or the beneficiaries of the trust.52 However,
the trustee is able to bind the beneficiaries to contracts that relate to the
trust property. For example, a trustee has the power to buy and sell trust
property and even to mortgage or pledge the trust property for a period
that extends beyond the term of the trust.53
46

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 401 (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 10
(2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 17.
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 8 cmt. b.
49 See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 551
(2014).
50 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 815(a)(2)(A). The UTC is a uniform act promulgated by the
Uniform Laws Commission to “provide States with precise, comprehensive and easily
accessible guidance on trust law questions.” See id. at prefatory note. The UTC has been
adopted in whole or in part in more than one half of the states. See Legislative Fact Sheet
– Trust Code, UNIF. L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet
.aspx?title=Trust%20Code (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
51 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 815(a)(2)(A). Many of the UTC provisions mirror those
in the Restatements on the Law of Trusts. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 85(1)(a) (2007).
52 See Part III.C, infra, for a discussion of agency theory in this context. The comments to section eight of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts describe the difference between an agent and a trustee:
An agent undertakes to act on behalf of his principal and subject to his control;
a trustee as such is not subject to the control of the beneficiary, except that he is
under a duty to deal with the trust property for his benefit in accordance with
the terms of the trust and can be compelled by the beneficiary to perform this
duty.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 8 cmt. b.
53 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 816(2), (5). Section 191(1) of the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts is somewhat more conservative on this issue, requiring the power to mortgage to
47
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While trustees can bind beneficiaries on contracts that relate to the
trust property, a beneficiary’s liability on that contract extends only so
far as the beneficiary’s interest in the trust property. Section 275 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides: “The beneficiary as such is
not personally liable upon contracts made by the trustee in the course of
the administration of the trust.”54 To date, only one court has taken the
position, albeit obliquely, that a beneficiary cannot be bound by the
trustee’s predispute arbitration agreement because such an agreement is
an attempt to bind the beneficiary personally. In Comer v. Micor, Inc.,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to
force an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) plan beneficiary to arbitrate his claim that the plan’s investment adviser had improperly concentrated the plan’s assets in high-tech stocks.55 The plan
trustee had signed an arbitration agreement with the plan’s investment
adviser. The court refused to hold the plan beneficiary to the agreement
because the beneficiary had not signed the agreement.56 The court
noted the following in a footnote:
Trust law provides a similar answer. Under trust law, the
beneficiary of a trust “is not personally liable upon contracts
made by the trustee in the course of the administration of the
trust.” In contrast to agents – who can subject their principals
to personal liability – “a trustee cannot subject the beneficiary
to such liabilities.”57
It appears that this court felt that an agreement to arbitrate entered into
by the trustee imposed a personal liability on the beneficiary that otherwise did not exist. This concept will be explored further in the analysis
section of this article.
Many of the cases described in this article involve allegedly improper investment decisions made by trustees and by the brokers and
investment advisers who were handling the trust assets.58 Among the
powers granted to most trustees either by statute or by the trust instruappear in or at least be clearly intended by the terms of the trust. Cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 191(1).
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 275.
55 Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2006).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1102 n.7 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 275, 8 cmt. c)
(emphasis added by the court).
58 For example, In re Jean F. Gardner Blind Trust, 70 P.3d 168 (Wash. Ct. App.
2003) included claims that the trustee failed to diversify the assets and that both the
trustee and the brokerage firm breached their duty to exercise reasonable care in investing the assets, id. at 170, and in Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Halliday, 873 So. 2d 400 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004), the beneficiary’s complaints related to whether the investments
were structured to balance the interest of the income beneficiary against those of the
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ment is the power to invest the trust property. Most states have adopted
some version of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA),59 which sets
forth the standard by which trustee investments will be judged and includes specific rules relating to investments by trustees.60 UPIA section
two requires a trustee to “invest and manage trust assets as a prudent
investor would, considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements and other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard,
the trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill and caution.”61 UPIA
section three requires as a general rule that the trustee diversify trust
investments.62 UPIA section five requires a trustee to invest the trust
assets “solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.”63
The UTC contains language that is similar to that of UPIA section
two and that relates to all trustee actions in administering the trust.
UTC section 804 requires a trustee to “administer the trust as a prudent
person would by considering the terms, purposes, distributional requirements and other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard,
the trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill and caution.”64 However,
not every trustee possesses all of the skills and expertise necessary for
the prudent administration of a trust. Comment (e) to section seventyseven of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts notes that an element of a
trustee’s duty of prudent administration is to obtain competent guidance
and assistance in matters that are outside the realm of the trustee’s skills
and expertise.65 UTC section 807 allows a trustee to “delegate duties
and powers that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could properly
delegate under the circumstances.”66 In further confirmation of this
power to delegate, UTC section 816(15) authorizes the trustee to pay
“compensation of the trustee and of employees and agents of the
trust.”67 However, the trustee retains some responsibility even if the
trustee has delegated duties, such as investment decisions, to a third
remainder beneficiaries. Id. at 402-03. See Part II, infra, for a detailed discussion of these
cases.
59 The UPIA was promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission (then known as
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws or “NCCUSL”) in
1994. See generally UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT (1994).
60 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT at prefatory note.
61 Id. § 2.
62 Id. § 3.
63 Id. § 5. This duty of loyalty is also expressed in UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a)
(2010).
64 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804. Note that this provision of the UTC closely mirrors the
standard of UPIA section two, which is discussed immediately above. UNIF. PRUDENT
INVESTOR ACT § 2.
65 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 cmt. e (2007).
66 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807(a).
67 Id. § 816(15).
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party. UTC section 807(a) requires the trustee to exercise reasonable
care, skill, and caution in:
(1) selecting an agent;
(2) establishing the scope and terms of the delegation,
consistent with the purposes and terms of the trust; and
(3) periodically reviewing the agent’s actions in order to
monitor the agent’s performance and compliance with the
terms of the delegation.68
The agent too will bear some responsibility toward the trust. UTC section 807(b) provides: “In performing a delegated function, an agent
owes a duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care to comply with the
terms of the delegation.”69 It is pursuant to this authority to employ
agents and to delegate functions that trustees often enlist the services of
financial institutions, broker-dealers and investment advisers in managing the trust assets.70
UTC section 813 requires a trustee to keep certain beneficiaries
“reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and of the
material facts necessary for them to protect their interests.”71 This conveyance of information typically takes the form of an annual accounting
or report to the beneficiaries “of the trust property, liability, receipts,
and disbursements, including the source and amount of the trustee’s
compensation, a listing of the trust assets and, if feasible, their respective market values.”72 This report may be waived by the beneficia68 Id. § 807(a). See Parker v. Shullman, 983 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), in
which an individual trustee hired an investment adviser after taking careful steps in interviewing and selecting the adviser. Id. at 645. When the trust assets declined in value, the
trust beneficiaries claimed that the trustee had violated Florida’s delegation statute. Id.
at 647. The court found that the trustee had acted prudently in selecting an investment
adviser and relying on that adviser’s advice. Id. In the case of In re Blumenkrantz, 824
N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sur. Ct. 2006), discussed at length in this article, the court discussed
whether New York’s statute allowing delegation is preempted by the Federal Arbitration
Act. Id. at 887.
69 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807(b) (2010).
70 For example, in one of the cases discussed at length in this article, Edward D.
Jones & Co. v. Ventura, 907 So. 2d 1035 (Ala. 2005), the question was raised as to
whether a conservator had the authority to enter into brokerage accounts with two brokerage firms. Id. at 1041. The Alabama Supreme Court noted that, under Alabama law,
the conservator was granted the same powers of investment that are granted to trustees
and therefore concluded that the conservator had the power to enter into the brokerage
accounts on behalf of the ward. Id.
71 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813(a).
72 Id. § 813(c). The underlying proceeding in In re Blumenkrantz was an accounting
proceeding. In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d at 889. The trustee impleaded the investment adviser when the beneficiary objected to his intermediate settlement of accounts.
Id. The court noted that the beneficiary did not have standing in an accounting proceeding to pursue a claim against a third party. Id. However, the court indicated that it was
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ries73 or by the settlor in the trust instrument.74 In addition to the annual reports, a trustee is required to respond to reasonable requests
from the trust beneficiaries for information about the administration of
the trust.75
A necessary component of the trustee’s control and management of
the trust property is the trustee’s ability to pursue, defend, and resolve
claims related to that property. Section 192 of the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts states, “The trustee can properly compromise, submit to arbitration or abandon claims affecting the trust property, provided that in
so doing he exercises reasonable prudence.”76 Comment (a) to that section explains further: “If it is reasonably prudent to compromise such
claims or submit them to arbitration, the trustee can properly do so. The
trustee has discretion whether to sue or to compromise claims or submit
them to arbitration, if he acts within the bounds of a reasonable judgment.”77 UTC section 816 lists, among the specific powers that a trustee
may exercise, the power to “resolve a dispute concerning the interpretation of the trust or its administration by mediation, arbitration, or other
procedure for alternative dispute resolution.”78 Also, if there is no conflict of interest,79 UTC section 303(4) provides that in the settlement of
disputes “a trustee may represent and bind the beneficiaries of the
trust.”80 This combination of provisions would seem to indicate that, if a
dispute arises between the trustee and a financial services institution,
the trustee could choose to engage in arbitration and thus bind the beneficiaries. If the trustee can choose to settle a dispute by binding arbitration after the dispute arises, it is not illogical to posit that the trustee can
agree to arbitrate even before a dispute erupts; in other words, the trustee can sign a predispute arbitration agreement that relates to the trust
property, provided the trustee exercises “reasonable prudence.”
Many of the cases described in this article include a claim by the
trust beneficiaries that the third party financial services institutions participated in and colluded with the trustee on the trustee’s breach of fiduwilling to entertain a motion for a limited trusteeship to allow the beneficiary to represent the trust in the arbitration. Id.
73 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813(d).
74 See id. § 105 (containing a list of provisions of the UTC that may not be waived
by the settlor. The duty to make annual reports does not appear on this list).
75 Id. § 813(a).
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 192 (1959).
77 Id. § 192 cmt. a.
78 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 816(23) (2010).
79 In In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sur. Ct. 2006), the court noted that the
trustee had a conflict of interest. Id. at 888. If the trustee sued the investment adviser and
the adviser was found liable, then the trustee might also be liable for an improper delegation of the investment function. Id.
80 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 303(4).
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ciary duty. Section 326 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides,
“A third person who, although not a transferee of trust property, has
notice that the trustee is committing a breach of trust and participates
therein is liable to the beneficiary for any loss caused by the breach of
trust.”81 In Bogert’s The Law of Trusts & Trustees82 – a highly-regarded
and oft-cited treatise on trust law – the authors cite cases that are of
particular relevance to this article, including cases that hold a third party
liable for “aiding the trustee to deceive the beneficiaries of an investment trust as to the financial stability of the trust; . . . inducing the trustee to make a non-legal investment; . . . paying trust funds over to a
fiduciary with knowledge that he intended to misappropriate them; . . .
and assisting the trustee to speculate with the trust funds.”83 As such, in
the cases described herein, there is little question as to whether the trust
beneficiaries could sue at least some of the broker-dealers and investment advisers whom the trustee engaged. The obstacle to their lawsuits
is the predispute arbitration agreement signed by the trustee. Thus, the
central issue is whether the trust beneficiaries, who did not sign this
agreement, are nevertheless bound by it.
II. ENFORCEABILITY OF TRUSTEE PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS – THE CASES
One of the commonly-touted advantages of the various methods of
alternative dispute resolution is that the parties have chosen ADR by
mutual consent. The issue, however, that dominates the cases involving
trustees and predispute arbitration agreements is that the beneficiaries
of the trust were not parties to the arbitration agreement and arguably
did not choose arbitration as an alternative to going to court. Generally
speaking, the issue of whether a nonsignatory can be bound to arbitrate
is a decision for the courts rather than the arbitrator.84 As described
herein, the specific issue of whether a nonsignatory trust beneficiary can
be bound by the trustee’s agreement to arbitrate has received recent
81

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 326.
BOGERT, ET AL., supra note 49.
83 See id. § 901.
84 See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (“[A]
gateway dispute about whether parties are bound by a given arbitration agreement clause
[is] for a court to decide.”); In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88 (citing Rockland
Cnty v. Primiano Const. Co., 431 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1980); Ben-Reuven v. Kidder Peabody,
526 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. 1988)) (“It is within the jurisdiction of the court to determine
whether the signatories to an agreement have agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration and whether a non-signatory is bound by an arbitration clause.”). However, the parties may override this general rule if the agreement shows unmistakably that the parties
intended for the arbitrator to decide the question. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
82
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attention by courts across the United States. Before examining the theories used by the courts, it is worthwhile to look at the facts of the cases
themselves. Most of these cases follow the same general pattern of an
individual trustee entering into an account agreement with a financial
services institution that contains a predispute arbitration provision.
However, there are nuanced differences in the fact patterns that will be
relevant to the discussion and analysis that follow.
A. Cases in which arbitration was compelled
In many of these cases, the courts have enforced the arbitration
agreement against the beneficiaries even though the beneficiaries did
not sign the agreement. Most of these cases were decided in state rather
than federal tribunals85 and thus are not binding upon courts in other
states. Some of these cases are unpublished, which limits the degree to
which they will be cited by other courts, even those in their own states.
Additionally, the overall sample size is relatively small. Thus, these
cases are not presented for their precedential value but rather as illustrative of the range and strength of the theories that the courts are using
when they choose to compel arbitration.
The earliest of these cases, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Eddings (hereinafter Eddings),86 was decided by the Court of Appeals
of Texas (Waco). A settlor established a trust for the benefit of his two
daughters and appointed a third party (an individual) as trustee. The
trust instrument gave the trustee broad management and contract powers, including the authority to settle disputes “by arbitration or otherwise.”87 The trustee signed a “Cash Management Account Agreement”
with Merrill Lynch in 1988. In 1990, the settlor terminated the original
trustee’s appointment and the trust assets were moved to another bank.
A different bank – the Bank of Troy – sued the former trustee, the trust,
85 Two exceptions are Warren v. Geller, No. 11-2282, 2014 WL 4186482 (E.D. La.
Aug. 22, 2014) and Gupta v. Merrill Lynch, No. 12–1787, 2014 WL 4063831 (E.D. La.
Aug. 15, 2014). Most of the federal cases discussing whether a trustee can bind the beneficiaries with a predispute arbitration agreement have arisen in the context of suits by
beneficiaries of ERISA plans. These cases have reached differing conclusions. In Comer
v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2006), the court held that an ERISA plan participant could not be compelled to arbitrate his claims against the plan’s investment adviser
despite arbitration agreements entered into by the plan trustee and the investment adviser. Id. at 1103-04. In Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1991), the court held that ERISA plan participants could be compelled to arbitrate both
their securities claims and their ERISA claims. Id. at 122. A discussion of these ERISA
cases is beyond the scope of this article.
86 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Eddings, 838 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App.
1992).
87 See id. at 876.
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Merrill Lynch and its representative.88 Merrill Lynch filed a third party
action for indemnification against the settlor.89 When the settlor (joined
by the beneficiaries) filed a counterclaim and cross-claim, Merrill Lynch
and its representative moved to compel arbitration. Both the settlor and
the beneficiaries argued that they should not be forced to arbitrate because they were not signatories to the arbitration agreement.90 The
court held that the settlor and the beneficiaries were bound by the arbitration agreement even though none of them had signed the contract
that contained that agreement.91 Citing the strong presumption in Texas
in favor of arbitration92 and the broad language of the predispute arbitration agreement,93 the court stated that the claims filed by the settlor
and the beneficiaries could only have arisen if the account agreement
existed94 and thus they were bound by the arbitration provision in the
agreement. The Eddings decision does not describe the basis of the settlor’s and beneficiaries’ counterclaim and cross-claim. Thus, it is difficult
to draw conclusions as to whether the settlor and beneficiaries had additional grounds for suing the former trustee separately. The judicial decision leaves the reader with the impression that the arbitration
proceeding would dispense completely with all possible claims that the
settlor and the beneficiaries may have had. It is unclear whether this
matter proceeded to arbitration as this author was unable to find a record of any arbitration award.95
88 The Bank of Troy claimed that certain shares of stock in which it had a security
interest were supposed to be held in a segregated account. Id.
89 Merrill Lynch said that any security interest the Bank of Troy had in the shares
should be imposed on the proceeds from the shares that were in Eddings’ hands. Id.
90 Id. at 878.
91 Id.
92 The court noted that both the state statutes and the state constitution favor arbitration, and “[i]f the settlor and beneficiaries of a trust could bring suit independently of
the trustee and thereby avoid the arbitration agreement, the strong state policy favoring
arbitration would be effectively thwarted.” Id. at 879.
93 The agreement by its terms applied to “all controversies which may arise between
us, including but not limited to those involving any transaction or the construction, performance or breach of this agreement or any other agreement.” Id. at 878.
94 Id. at 879. This theory, which is sometimes referred to as the “underlying basis”
theory, is described in Part III.A, infra.
95 FINRA keeps a database of arbitration awards. Arbitration Overview, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/arbitration-overview (last visited Oct. 1,
2015). However, an arbitration will appear on the FINRA website only “if an award is
issued at the conclusion of the case.” Id. In situations where an arbitration does not show
up in the database, it is possible that no award was issued or that the parties settled the
case prior to the conclusion of the arbitration. A few years after the Eddings case was
decided, the same family members involved in that case entered into an arbitration with
A.G. Edwards. Eddings v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. 1993-003607 (Oct. 18, 1995),
http://finraawardsonline.finra.org/Search/ViewDocument/37228. It is unclear in this context whether the family members were suing as trust beneficiaries or as individual inves-
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In 2003, the Court of Appeals of Washington (Division 1) rendered
an opinion in In re Jean F. Gardner Amended Blind Trust (hereinafter
Gardner).96 The trust in this case was a “blind trust” established by Ms.
Gardner with herself as the lifetime beneficiary.97 She was both the settlor and a beneficiary of the trust. She appointed an individual as trustee
and that individual signed an account agreement with a financial services institution, First Union Securities (which later became Wachovia
Securities). The agreement contained language that said, “I understand
that I am consenting to arbitration of any disputes between you and me
and I understand the following . . . . The parties are waiving their right
to seek remedies in court.”98 The agreement defined the words “I” and
“me” to refer to “each person who signs the Application.”99 When the
trust’s value declined substantially over a three-year period, the settlorbeneficiary sued the individual trustee and First Union Securities. She
alleged that the trustee had breached his fiduciary duty by “imprudently
investing the assets . . . [and] failing to properly diversify the assets of
the trust.”100 Further, she claimed that First Union was negligent because it had not “exercise[d] reasonable care in investing the assets.”101
The trustee filed a contribution claim against First Union. Both the settlor-beneficiary and the trustee claimed that they were not bound by the
arbitration agreement, but for different reasons. The settlor-beneficiary
claimed that she was not bound by the agreement because she did not
sign it.102 Finding no Washington case on point, the court cited Eddings
as persuasive and compelled the settlor-beneficiary to arbitrate her
claims.103 The court reasoned that the trustee had the authority to enter
tors. See id. This Eddings matter was arbitrated in the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) forum. (As noted supra note 19, the NYSE arbitration forum was a precursor to
the FINRA forum.) An award was issued on October 18, 1995, the record of which indicates that the family alleged a “breach of fiduciary duty and failure to supervise in connection with options trading in a trust account” as well as that A.G. Edwards engaged in
“account churning.” Id. The record also shows that the Eddings family filed a claim for
$8,775,000, and the arbitration panel awarded them $1,494,000. Id. As with most arbitration awards, the report includes no explanation of the reasoning behind the award. Id.
96 In re Jean F. Gardner Amended Blind Trust (In re Gardner), 70 P.3d 168 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2003).
97 Id. at 168. The settlor of a blind trust transfers investments to an independent
trustee and often has no knowledge of the investments that the trust holds. See BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
98 In re Gardner, 70 P.3d at 171.
99 Id. at 169.
100 Id. at 170.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 169.
103 Id. The Washington court distinguished Clark v. Clark, 57 P.3d 95 (Okla. 2002), a
case in which a trust beneficiary was found not to be bound by the arbitration agreement.
See In re Jean F. Gardner Amended Blind Trust (In re Gardner), 70 P.3d 168, 169 (Wash.

Fall/Winter 2014] PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

293

into the agreement and that the trust was legally bound by that agreement.104 Using the same theory articulated in Eddings, the court found
that the settlor-beneficiary was bound to arbitrate because her claims
directly concerned or arose from the account agreement that contained
the predispute arbitration provision.105 The trustee argued that arbitration would deny him the right to contribution in that First Union could
argue that a jury verdict could not be enforced against it because it was
not a party to the lawsuit. Thus, the trustee would be forced to relitigate
First Union’s fault.106 The Washington court cited a case in which the
Supreme Court of the United States had made it clear that arbitration
agreements can be enforced even if the arbitration would result eventually in bifurcated proceedings with decisions relevant to other parties
being made in different forums.107 It is unclear whether the Gardner
case actually proceeded to arbitration, as this author was unsuccessful in
finding any record of an arbitration award.
In 2005, in Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Ventura (hereinafter Ventura), the Supreme Court of Alabama required a trust beneficiary to
arbitrate even though the beneficiary had not signed the arbitration
agreement.108 The court began its opinion with this sentence: “This is an
arbitration case.”109 The trust at issue was one funded by the proceeds
of a wrongful death action filed on behalf of a minor. According to the
court, “[a] trust estate, funded with those moneys, was established on
[the minor’s] behalf.”110 The minor’s mother was appointed to serve as
Ct. App. 2003); Clark, 57 P.3d at 99. The Clark case is discussed in detail later in this
section.
104 In re Gardner, 70 P.3d at 169.
105 Id. at 170.
106 Id. The court did not discuss whether the trustee’s contribution claim would also
be subject to the arbitration clause. For an example of a discussion of the same ilk, see
Bayer v. Harris Bank, N.A., 2004 WL 2303495 (D. Or. 2004) in which a trustee was forced
to arbitrate an indemnity claim that it had against the investment manager due to the
arbitration provision in their account agreement. Id. at *4.
107 In re Gardner, 70 P.3d at 170 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983)). The trustee also argued that Washington’s Trust &
Estate Dispute Resolution Act allowed him to pursue a variety of ADR methods and
that forcing him to arbitrate would preclude him from pursuing those other methods. Id.
at 171. Washington’s statute gives parties to disputes involving trusts, estates, and nonprobate matters access to a process for first attempting to settle the dispute through mediation and, if mediation is unsuccessful, through arbitration. WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 11:96A.270 to 11:96A.320 (2000). The Washington court acknowledged that the state
statute gives superior courts original subject matter jurisdiction over trust matters but
that the trustee had waived the jurisdiction when he signed the arbitration agreement. In
re Gardner, 70 P.3d at 171.
108 Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Ventura (Ventura), 907 So. 2d 1035, 1035 (Ala. 2005).
109 Id. at 1036.
110 Id.
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his guardian and conservator.111 The court order appointing her gave
her broad statutory powers, including the power to invest and reinvest
funds of the estate as would a trustee.112 The mother opened brokerage
accounts with Edward D. Jones and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.
The account contracts contained arbitration agreements.113 When the
minor reached the age of majority and discovered that there were no
liquid assets left in the accounts, he sued his mother for an accounting
and a judgment was entered against her for the original amount of the
trust assets.114 The court in that hearing found that, with one exception,
“absolutely no legally permissible investment of [the minor’s] estate had
been made by the Conservator.”115 The young man then sued the brokerage firms. He claimed that they had been aware that the funds were
trust funds,116 they had participated in the breach of the conservator’s
fiduciary duty, and they had induced the conservator to place the funds
with them by making false statements about their knowledge of the law
relating to the particular type of investments that are appropriate in a
conservatorship.117 The court first determined that under applicable law
the mother as conservator had had the authority to enter into the agreements with the brokerage firms.118 The court did not feel the need to
examine every investment made pursuant to these contracts. The court
then determined that all of the young man’s claims against the brokerage firms related directly to and arose out of the agreements his mother
had signed with those firms.119 The court discussed additional theories
to bolster its decision to hold the young man to the arbitration agreements. The court found that he was a third party beneficiary to these
agreements in that, through his claims about the mismanagement of the
accounts, he was seeking the benefit of those agreements.120 The court
111 Id. The amount of the minor’s personal injury award was $500,000. Id. The
mother, as conservator, was ordered to post a bond of $620,000. Id. She did in fact post a
bond, but only in the amount of $500,000. Id. at 1037. The court’s opinion is somewhat
confusing as to whether the accounts were opened as accounts for the trust or as “guardianship accounts” opened by the mother as conservator. See id.
112 Id. at 1037, 1039, 1041.
113 Id. at 1038-39.
114 Id. at 1037.
115 Id. Alabama Code section 19-3-120 contains a list of legally permissible investments for Alabama guardians, and other fiduciaries. ALA. CODE § 19-3-120 (2006). The
court ordered the mother to pay the son $500,000 plus interest from the date of the
establishment of the conservatorship. Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Ventura (Ventura), 907
So. 2d 1035, 1037-38 (Ala. 2005).
116 The young man claimed that this knowledge made the brokerage firms trustees
“in invitum.” Ventura, 907 So. 2d at 1038.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1041.
119 Id. at 1042.
120 Id.
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concluded that the young man could not bring actions revolving around
those agreements while at the same time refusing to be bound by the
arbitration provision in the agreements.121 The Ventura matter proceeded to arbitration and a decision was rendered on December 2,
2008.122 Ventura’s claims against Edward D. Jones included claims of
“1) breach of fiduciary duty; 2) fraud and suppression; 3) fraudulent
suppression; and 4) negligence/wantonness” in relation to the purchase
of equity mutual funds for the account. Ventura requested compensatory and punitive damages of $500,000 plus interest, attorneys’ fees and
costs.123 The FINRA arbitration panel awarded Ventura $3,820 plus
interest.124
In 2006, the Surrogate’s Court, Nassau County, New York weighed
in on the binding effect of a predispute arbitration agreement signed by
a trustee and held that both the trustee and the beneficiary were bound
by the agreement.125 In re Blumenkrantz began when the trustee petitioned for a voluntary settlement of accounts for a four-year period.126
The beneficiary objected and claimed that the trustee and Wachovia Securities had mismanaged the trust account, resulting in a loss in value of
more than fifty percent. The trustee sought to implead Wachovia Securities, which then moved to compel arbitration. According to the court,
the trustee had delegated his investment duties to Wachovia Securities
and had signed an account agreement that contained an arbitration provision.127 Both the trustee and the beneficiary argued that they were not
bound by the arbitration provision. The trustee claimed that the New
York law, which provides that the delegee of a trustee’s function submits
121 Id. The court did not see the need to discuss the “trustee in invitum” claim, stating that that was an issue for the arbitrator to decide. Id. at 1042-43.
122 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Edward Jones, Inc., No. 07-01803 (Dec. 2, 2008), http://
finraawardsonline.finra.org/Search/ViewDocument/41442.
123 Id.
124 Id. Another aspect of this arbitration was a claim by the insurance company that
had bonded the conservator against Edward D. Jones. The insurance company claimed
$500,000 in compensatory damages for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence and wantonness. The arbitration panel awarded the insurance company the same amount it had
awarded Ventura – $3,820 plus interest. Id. The panel’s summary of the case indicates
that it was aware that a judgment had been entered against the conservator and that the
insurance company was being asked to cover that judgment with its $500,000 bond. See
id.
125 In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sur. Ct. 2006). Interestingly, as is discussed in Part II.B, infra, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court refused to compel a trust beneficiary to arbitration in Besser v. Miller, using third party
beneficiary theory. Besser v. Miller, 785 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div. 2004). The
Blumenkrantz court noted Besser in passing but did not distinguish it. See In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
126 In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
127 Id.
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to the jurisdiction of the New York courts, guarantees a judicial forum
to both the trustee and the beneficiary.128 The Surrogate’s Court found
this law to be in conflict with and thus preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.129 The court then went on to examine the beneficiary’s status as a nonsignatory to the account. The court determined that all of
her claims arose from the customer agreement and that she could not
simultaneously assert a claim under the agreement and reject the arbitration provision.130 Finally, the court considered who would be the
proper party to represent the trust in the arbitration. Noting that while,
in most cases, it is the trustee who has the authority to maintain actions
on behalf of the trust, in this case the trustee had a conflict of interest.
The trustee’s liability for the loss in value was tied directly to the liability of Wachovia Securities in that a finding that Wachovia Securities had
mismanaged the fund would result in a finding that the trustee had not
properly supervised the delegee.131 On the other hand, the court found
that the beneficiary lacked standing in an accounting proceeding to
bring an action for breach of fiduciary duty against Wachovia Securities.132 Consequently the court invited the beneficiary to petition for
limited letters of trusteeship to allow her to represent the trust in the
arbitration proceeding.133 It is unclear whether this arbitration took
place, as this author is unable to locate any record of the arbitration.
Three years after the Blumenkrantz decision, the New York Surrogate’s Court reached a similar conclusion in In re Downs Charitable Remainder Trust.134 In that case, noting that the trustee also had a conflict
of interest, the court gave the trustee ten days in which to commence the
arbitration proceeding. Should he fail to do so, the court indicated that
it would entertain a petition for limited trusteeship by the beneficiary.135
128 Id. at 886. New York Estate Powers & Trusts Law section 11-2.3(c)(3) provides as
follows: “By accepting the delegation of a trustee’s function from the trustee of a trust
that is subject to the law of New York, the delegee submits to the jurisdiction of the
courts of New York even if a delegation agreement provides otherwise, and the delegee
may be made a party to any proceeding in such courts that places in issue the decisions or
actions of the delegee.” N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(c)(3) (McKinney
2010).
129 In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d at 887. In doing so, the court noted that New
York has a strong public policy favoring arbitration. Id.
130 Id. at 888.
131 The court said, “The trustee cannot be held liable for failure to oversee management of the funds absent a determination by the arbitrator that Wachovia Securities is
liable to the trust for the loss incurred.” Id. at 888.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 In re Downs Charitable Remainder Trust, No. 95818/A, 2009 WL 724069, at *2
(N.Y. Sur. Ct. Mar. 18, 2009).
135 Id.
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The 2007 case of French v. Wachovia Bank involved two sets of
claims.136 Wachovia Bank was the trustee of the French trust. As trustee, Wachovia signed a “Client Agreement” with some of its affiliates
(the “Wachovia Affiliates”) through which it agreed to purchase certain
insurance policies to replace those that were already in the trust. The
agreement contained an arbitration provision. The beneficiaries of the
trust sued Wachovia for self-dealing and for breaching its duty to administer the trust reasonably. The beneficiaries also sued the Wachovia Affiliates for inducing them to approve the purchase of the policies by
providing them with false and misleading information.137 The court
noted that in this case the trustee and the brokerage firm were essentially the same entity. The court refused to compel the beneficiaries to
arbitrate their claims against Wachovia as trustee.138 To do otherwise,
said the court, would “force beneficiaries to arbitrate their claims
against their trustee without the beneficiaries ever expressly agreeing to
do so.”139 On the other hand, the court compelled the beneficiaries to
arbitrate their claim against the Wachovia Affiliates.140 The court cited
Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc. for the proposition
that a trustee could bind beneficiaries of the trust to arbitrate.141
Neither the Bird opinion nor the French opinion contained discussion as
to the rationale behind this holding. On the question of whether the
French beneficiaries’ claim against the Wachovia Affiliates was arbitrable, the French court concluded by applying the presumption in favor of
arbitration and interpreted the arbitration provision in the Client
Agreement as covering those claims.142 The court stayed the litigation
against the trustee until the completion of the arbitration.
The two most recent cases analyzing the binding effect of a predispute arbitration clause both arose in Louisiana. The first is an unpublished opinion from the Louisiana Court of Appeal (First Circuit),
136 French v. Wachovia Bank, No. 06-C-869, 2007 WL 895820, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Mar.
21, 2007).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. (citing Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Exp., Inc., 871 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1989)
cert. granted, judgment vacated, 493 U.S. 884 (1989) (involving the beneficiaries of an
ERISA plan)). This decision was revisited in Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1991) after being vacated by the Supreme Court, but the
ruling relating to holding the nonsignatory beneficiaries to the arbitration agreement remained intact. As mentioned in note 85, supra, the cases exploring whether ERISA plan
beneficiaries are bound by arbitration agreements signed by the plan trustees are beyond
the scope of this article.
142 French, 2007 WL 895820, at *2.
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Green v. Regions Bank and Morgan Keegan & Co.143 The second is
Warren v. Geller, a case decided by the federal district court in the Eastern District of Louisiana.144
In Green, the beneficiary of the trust was a minor who had been
severely injured in an accident. A special needs trust145 had been set up
in 2000 with her personal injury settlement and her father had been
named trustee of the trust. The trust was apparently designed so that no
distributions other than medical expense distributions could be made
without prior court approval. The father opened a checking account at
Regions into which he allegedly deposited trust funds and he opened a
trust account at Morgan Keegan into which he deposited $300,000. The
father died in 2008, at which point it was discovered that all but $2,000
of the trust funds had been exhausted.146 The beneficiary, when she
reached the age of majority, filed suit against Regions Bank and Morgan
Keegan alleging breach of contract, negligence, breach of their duty to
use reasonable care in advising the father, and negligent misrepresentation. The defendants introduced evidence showing that the father had
signed documents that clearly contained an arbitration agreement. The
beneficiary cited a Louisiana statute that gives beneficiaries the right to
enforce “a right of the trust estate.”147 The court found that the beneficiary’s claims were based on a breach of the same agreements that contained the arbitration provision.148 Her father, as trustee, had bound the
trust to arbitrate controversies relating to the accounts. Thus, the “rights
of the Trust are subject to binding arbitration.”149 This author was unable to locate a record of any arbitration in this case, but the judicial
decision was rendered in March 2014, so the proceeding, if any, may not
yet be completed.
In Warren, the United States District Court of the Eastern District
of Louisiana ordered to arbitration a case involving a life insurance trust
funded by the proceeds of a life insurance policy on the life of former
New Orleans Saints player Frank Warren. Mr. Geller had served as a
143 Green v. Regions Bank, No. 2013 CA 0771, 2014 WL 3555820 (La. Ct. App. Mar.
19, 2014).
144 Warren v. Geller, No. 11-2282, 2014 WL 4186482 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2014).
145 In footnote 1, the Green court described a special needs trust as follows:
Federal law provides for the establishment of a special needs trust to provide funding for the care of a disabled person in addition to Medicaid or Social
Security disability benefits for which the person may be eligible. Here, the parties refer to the Trust as a “special needs trust,” but we do not analyze whether
this Trust indeed satisfies the requirements of federal law.
Id. at *1 n.1 (citations omitted).
146 Id. at *1.
147 Id. at *5.
148 Id. at *6.
149 Id. at *7.
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financial advisor and agent for Mr. Warren and in that capacity had suggested that Mr. Warren purchase an insurance policy.150 When Mr. Warren died, the one million dollar proceeds of the policy were paid into a
trust, of which Mr. Geller was the trustee; the trust was to benefit Mr.
Warren’s widow and children.151 Mr. Geller, as trustee, opened a trust
account with Morgan Keegan; Mr. Warren’s widow claimed that, over
time, with the assistance of two Morgan Keegan employees, Moore and
Cadena, Mr. Geller depleted the bulk of the trust assets for his own
personal use.152 Ms. Warren sued Mr. Geller, Moore, Cadena, and Morgan Keegan for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of due diligence, negligence, fraud, and conversion.153 The defendants claimed that all the
claims must be arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration clause that was contained in the client agreement that established the trust account with
Morgan Keegan.154 The District Court examined, first, whether a valid
arbitration agreement existed; second, whether the dispute came within
the scope of the agreement; and third, whether any federal statute or
policy would render the claim nonarbitrable.155 The court answered the
first and second questions in the affirmative, noting that Ms. Warren was
not challenging the validity of the client agreement which contained the
arbitration clause and that the clause applied broadly to “all controversies . . . which may arise from any account or for any cause whatsoever.”156 The court also pointed out that Ms. Warren had not cited any

150

Warren v. Geller, No. 11-2282, 2014 WL 4186482, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2014).
Id. at *2. The opinion indicates that there was some question as to whether Mr.
Warren had actually signed the documents that caused Mr. Geller to be appointed trustee. Id.
152 Id. at *6. The plaintiff alleged that in the 18 months the account was open, funds
in the amount of over $800,000 were transferred by Moore and Cadena to Mr. Geller’s
personal account at Morgan Keegan. Id. When the account was closed in 2007, all of the
trust funds had been exhausted. Id. at *2. Mr. Geller later pled guilty to one count of wire
fraud in conjunction with the case. Former Sports Agent, Benjamin M. Geller, Pleads
Guilty to Wire Fraud, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 18, 2013) http://www.justice.gov/usao-edla/
pr/former-sports-agent-benjamin-m-geller-pleads-guilty-wire-fraud. Mr. Warren’s widow
stated in one of her pleadings, “Moore and Cadena are extremely fortunate that they
were not prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s office for aiding and abetting Geller in the
fraud.” Warren, 2014 WL 4186482, at *5.
153 Warren, 2014 WL 4186482, at *3.
154 Id. at *2
155 Id. at *12. The court adopted the three-step analysis used by the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 233-34 (5th Cir. 2009).
Warren, 2014 WL 4186482, at *12.
156 Warren, 2014 WL 4186482, at *12. The court pointed out that Ms. Warren was
challenging the client agreement itself (rather than the arbitration clause) and that this
was an issue that must be heard by the arbitrator. Id.
151
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federal or state policy that would make her claims unarbitrable.157 The
court next addressed whether the fact that Ms. Warren had not signed
the client agreement (and, according to her, had not even known about
the agreement) indicated that she should not be bound by the agreement.158 The court found that she was bound by the arbitration clause
under the theory that she was a third-party beneficiary to the client
agreement.159 The court found that the three elements of third-party
beneficiary theory, as articulated under Louisiana law,160 were satisfied
in that the client agreement indicated that the account was for a trust,
the agreement specified with certainty the benefits that Ms. Warren was
to receive under the trust (payments of $4800 a month), and the benefits
were not incidental to the trust but rather were the sole reason the trust
was created.161 The court also found as an “alternative ground” that Ms.
Warren was bound by the arbitration clause by virtue of having accepted
the benefits of the client contract.162 The court examined but rejected
the argument that Mr. Geller had signed the client agreement as an
agent of Ms. Warren.163
The cases described above most clearly illustrate the question of
whether a nonsignatory beneficiary is bound by a predispute arbitration
agreement signed by the trustee. Four related cases also discussed this
issue, although the facts and posture of these cases are somewhat different. In Smith v. Multi-Financial Securities Corporation, the Colorado
Court of Appeals (Div. V) examined a situation in which the trustee was
also an employee of the investment company with which the trust had
157 Id. Ms. Warren had argued that “[t]here is nothing in the FAA or cited from the
FAA that indicates theft and abetting theft through civil fraud and gross negligence is
favored for arbitration.” Id. at *7. The court cited the United States Supreme Court opinion in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), in which the
plaintiffs had sought to avoid arbitration by claiming that the contract was induced by
fraudulent misrepresentation. The Warren court pointed out that the Supreme Court had
said that the FAA precludes arbitration only if the claim of fraud in the inducement
relates to the arbitration agreement itself rather than to the underlying contract. Warren,
2014 WL 4186482, at *12.
158 Id. at *13.
159 Id.
160 The court noted that these three elements are “a stipulation in favor of the thirdparty that is manifestly clear; a certainty as to the benefit provided to the third party; and
that the benefit was not a mere incident of the contract between the parties.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Joseph v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2 of Parish of St. Mary,
939 So.2d 1206, 1212 (2006)).
161 Id.
162 Id. at *14. Among other cases, the court cited the Smith case (discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 164-69) and the Gardner case (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 96-107) as “out-of-circuit cases” that had upheld arbitration clauses under
this equitable estoppel theory. Id.
163 Id. at *13.
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an account.164 The account agreement included an arbitration clause.
The beneficiaries brought an action against the trustee claiming that he
had violated his fiduciary duties as trustee of the trust because he had
made investments that were not suitable to the trust or the beneficiaries’
needs. They claimed that the investment company was liable for the acts
of its employee under the theory of respondeat superior and because it
had failed to adequately supervise its employee. The beneficiaries also
alleged that the investment company had violated the Securities Act by
making unsuitable investments and unauthorized cash disbursements
from the trust. The beneficiaries took care to frame their complaints as
violations of the trustee’s fiduciary duties as trustee rather than as
breach of contract claims.165 However, the court found that the claims
in fact arose out of the account agreements and thus were arbitrable.166
In so doing, the court noted, “Courts should not permit creative legal
theories to undermine [the] presumption favoring arbitrability.”167 Applying this presumption, the court compelled arbitration even though
the beneficiaries’ claims arose both out of the account and out of the
trustee’s duties under the trust instrument. The court also found that the
beneficiaries were bound to arbitrate because they could not invoke the
duties the investment company owed them under the account agreement while avoiding the arbitration provision.168 The court’s opinion included extensive references to the Eddings and Gardner cases as well as
a discussion distinguishing the case Clark v. Clark,169 which is discussed
in Part II.B, infra.
Larson v. Speetjens, an unreported case from the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of California, is a bit unusual in the
context of this article in that the arbitration agreement at issue was included in an engagement agreement between the trustee and attorneys
she hired to pursue claims against an investment adviser.170 This case
offers some limited insight into the theories used by the courts in the
other cases. The trust beneficiaries claimed that they should not be
bound by the agreement because they had not signed it and because the
trustee had signed the agreement in her individual capacity rather than
in her fiduciary capacity.171 The court compelled arbitration, relying pri164

Smith v. Multi-Fin. Sec. Corp., 171 P.3d 1267, 1267 (Colo. App. 2007).
Id. at 1267.
166 Id. at 1270.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 1272, 1273.
170 Larson v. Speetjens, No. C05-3176 SBA, 2006 WL 2567873, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
5, 2006).
171 Id.
165
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marily on the estoppel theory and agency theory.172 The court held that
the beneficiaries’ “entire case hinges on the attorney-client relationship
created by the Agreements”173 and that their claims were “inextricably
intertwined with the Agreements”174 and thus they could not “seek to
enforce the rights the attorney-client relationship provided them and
avoid the requirement that any dispute arising out of the Agreements be
arbitrated.”175 The court also found that the trustee acting in her individual capacity had the ostensible authority to enter into the attorneyclient agreement on behalf of the beneficiaries and thus that they were
bound to that agreement under agency theory.176
In 2012, in another unreported opinion, Tobel v. AXA Equitable
Life Insurance Company, the Court of Appeals of Michigan held not
only that nonsignatory trustees were bound by an arbitration agreement
signed by the settlors of the trust, but also that a nonsignatory defendant
could compel arbitration.177 The arbitration agreement was part of a financial services agreement that two brothers signed with a financial services company. Upon the advice of an employee of that company and an
employee of a life insurance company, the brothers purchased flexible
premium variable life insurance policies from the life insurance company (which was not a party to the account agreement). The brothers
transferred the insurance policies to their wives, who were the trustees
of trusts established by the brothers.178 The brothers and the trustees
then sued the financial services company and the insurance company
alleging that both of them had knowingly misrepresented the cost of the
premiums and had failed to explain the various risks associated with the
policies. Both defendants moved to compel arbitration.179 The court
found that the trustees, as assignees of the brothers, were bound by the
arbitration agreement the brothers had signed.180 The court also held
that the life insurance company could compel arbitration even though it
was a nonsignatory to the account agreement because it was an agent of
the financial services company and its claims were inextricably intertwined with those of the financial services company.181 The Tobel matter proceeded to arbitration and a decision was rendered on June 10,
172

These theories are discussed in Part III, infra.
Larson, 2006 WL 2567873, at *7.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at *8.
177 Tobel v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. 298129, 2012 WL 555801, at *1 (Mich.
App. 2012).
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 See id. at *1, *8.
181 See id. at *1, *10.
173
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2014.182 The claimants alleged numerous causes of action: “suitability;
excess commissions; securities fraud-misrepresentation, non-disclosure,
use of manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent devices; silent fraud/
fraudulent concealment; breach of fiduciary duties; and negligence.”183
The brothers and their wives (both individually and as trustees) initially
requested an award in the amount of $4,500,000. However, the record
indicates that at the close of the hearing, each couple requested damages of $275,000. The arbitration panel awarded one couple $100,000 in
compensatory damages and the second couple $75,000.184
In Shahan v. Staley, the Court of Appeals of Arizona (Div. 2, Dept.
B) faced the unusual situation of a trust beneficiary moving to compel
arbitration against a securities broker after the trust account declined in
value during the broker’s management of the trust.185 This case did not
involve an arbitration clause. Rather, the beneficiary sought to compel
arbitration under the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) rule that required NASD members to arbitrate securities disputes with their customers should the customers so choose. The broker
argued that the beneficiary was not its “customer,” but rather, the trust
was its customer, and thus only the trustee could compel him to arbitrate.186 The court found that the beneficiary was the intended third
party beneficiary of the customer agreement between the trustee and
the broker and thus could either bring an action against the trustee or
could compel the trustee to arbitrate.187
B. Cases in which arbitration was not compelled
Courts in six cases have refused to compel trust beneficiaries to arbitrate disputes under predispute arbitration agreements that they had
not signed. In 2002, in Clark v. Clark, the Court of Civil Appeals of
Oklahoma examined an account agreement for a family trust that was
established by the plaintiff’s father.188 The father served as trustee while
he was alive. The trust provided for specified monthly payments to the
mother during her life, with the remainder to be paid to the plaintiff,
who was their son. When the father died, the son served briefly as successor trustee but then resigned and his son became the successor trustee. The new trustee moved trust assets, totaling approximately
182 See Tobel v. Baird, No. 12-01900 (June 9, 2014), http://finraawardsonline.finra.org/
Search/ViewDocument/63903.
183 Id.
184 See id.
185 See Shahan v. Staley, 932 P.2d 1345, 1345 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
186 See id. at 1348.
187 See id.
188 See Clark v. Clark, 57 P.3d 95, 96 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).
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$333,000, to an Oklahoma office of Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith.189 He set up both a cash management account and a margin account at Merrill Lynch. The client agreement signed by the trustee contained an arbitration provision.190 The court stressed the fact that the
plaintiff did not know that the Merrill Lynch account had been established nor did he know about the agreement and arbitration clause.191
The new trustee made numerous withdrawals from the account, some of
which were facilitated by a debit card issued to him by Merrill Lynch
and with a Visa card and checks issued for the trust account. By the time
the plaintiff was able to secure information about the account, it had
been reduced to $43.00.192 The plaintiff filed claims of breach of fiduciary duty and negligence against both the trustee and Merrill Lynch. The
trial court granted Merrill Lynch’s motion to compel arbitration, and the
arbitration panel denied all of the plaintiff’s claims against Merrill
Lynch.193 The trial court confirmed by judgment the arbitration award,
and the plaintiff appealed.194 The appellate court found that compelling
the plaintiff to arbitrate his claims against Merrill Lynch had been inappropriate.195 The court examined the nature of the plaintiff’s claims
against Merrill Lynch, which highlighted the fact that Merrill Lynch
owed the plaintiff a duty to protect the trust assets from unreasonable
risk of harm. The court pointed to Merrill Lynch’s actions in allowing
the trustee to set up a margin account, issuing the debit and Visa cards
and giving check-writing privileges to the trustee. The court noted the
plaintiff’s allegation that all of these actions were taken despite the fact
that Merrill Lynch knew that the trust was for the benefit of the plaintiff’s aging mother and authorized only a small specified payment per
month. The court also noted that the “petition [of the plaintiff] made no
reference to the Agreement or any of its terms.”196 The court disagreed
with Merrill Lynch’s claim that any fiduciary duties it had toward the
plaintiff arose solely from the account agreement. Instead, the court
found that Merrill Lynch owed the plaintiff duties beyond the duties
under the agreement.197 Thus, the court found that the plaintiff’s claims
did not arise under the account agreement. (Again, the court emphasized the fact that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the agreement.198)
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

See id. at 96.
Id.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 96.
Id.
Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id.
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On the question of whether the plaintiff could be bound to an arbitration agreement that he did not sign, the court pointed out first that the
trustee was not an agent of the trust or the beneficiaries. The court concluded that the account agreement was the “personal undertaking” of
the trustee, which bound the trustee to arbitrate his claims but that did
not bind the trust beneficiary.199 In a special concurrence, one of the
judges emphasized that the key to the court’s holding was its finding
that the account agreement was not the underlying basis for the plaintiff’s claims.200 Citing Eddings, the concurring judge said that if the beneficiaries had no claim against the investment firm in the absence of the
agreement containing the arbitration clause, then they would be bound
by the clause.201
In 2004, the District Court of Appeal of Florida (4th District) also
refused to compel a beneficiary to arbitrate pursuant to an arbitration
provision that the beneficiary had not signed. The beneficiary in Morgan
Stanley v. Halliday was the life income beneficiary of a trust of which
the trustees were the remainder beneficiaries.202 The trustees placed the
trust assets in an account with Morgan Stanley, and the customer account agreement included an arbitration clause.203 The beneficiary sued
the trustees and Morgan Stanley for mismanagement of the trust assets.204 The Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Morgan Stanley’s motion to compel arbitration.205 The trial court
noted in its order that Morgan Stanley sought to bind the beneficiary to
the arbitration provision under the theory that she was a third party
beneficiary of the account agreement. The appellate court noted that
this theory applied only if the agreement was for the primary and direct
benefit of the plaintiff. The court found, instead, that, if anything, the
beneficiary received only an incidental benefit from the agreement.206
The court surmised that the account agreement was for the benefit of
the trustees in that they may have thought they were relieving themselves from personal liability by turning the management of the trust
assets over to Morgan Stanley.207 The court also noted that compelling
199
200
201
202

Id. at 99.
Id. at 100 (Buettner, J., specially concurring).
Id.
Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Halliday, 873 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2004).
203

Id.
In a footnote, the court explained that the beneficiary’s mismanagement claim
revolved around the fact that the trustee placed assets primarily in growth investments
(which would benefit themselves as remainder beneficiaries) rather than in investments
designed to produce income, to which she was entitled. Id. at 404 n.3.
205 Id. at 402.
206 Id. at 403.
207 The court speculated as follows:
204
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arbitration in these circumstances would not have the benefit of shortening the litigation because the beneficiary would still want to pursue
litigation against the trustee.208 The court also examined whether agency
theory could be applied to compel the beneficiaries to arbitrate and concluded that it could not.209
In 2004, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
also refused to compel a trust beneficiary to arbitrate its claim against a
brokerage firm in Besser v. Miller, Advest, Inc. and Carlsen.210 Unfortunately, the opinion in this case is quite sparse and contains almost no
description of the facts let alone detailed discussion of its reasoning. The
court, using the third party beneficiary theory, said simply, “There is no
evidence establishing that the parties to the brokerage agreement intended petitioner to be bound by the arbitration clause therein and no
evidence that petitioner intended to be so bound.”211 This case was referred to in passing in Blumenkrantz, but the Blumenkrantz court did
not discuss the case nor did it distinguish it.212
In 2010, in Schmitz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, the
Appellate Court of Illinois (5th District) also discussed agency theory
and third party beneficiary theory when it refused to hold nonsignatory
beneficiaries to the arbitration agreement signed by the trustee.213 The
original co-trustees of the trust were the parents of the beneficiaries.
For all we know from this bare bones motion and the above documents, the
customer account agreement was more than likely primarily for the benefit of
the Trustees. They may have thought that in relieving themselves of making the
daily investment decisions for the management of those assets they could
thereby lessen their personal culpability for mismanagement.
Id. at 405.
208 Id. at 404.
209 Id. at 402. In a footnote, the court dealt with two other arguments raised by Morgan Stanley. The first of these arguments was the fact that the account name included the
common “FBO” language (Trustee FBO Beneficiary) indicating that the trust was “for
the benefit of” the beneficiary. The court said that this language did not mean that the
account agreement with Morgan Stanley was “for the benefit of” the beneficiary, thus
making her a third party beneficiary of the agreement. Second, the court dismissed Morgan Stanley’s claim that, because the beneficiary had an individual account with them
that included an arbitration agreement, she should be bound by the trust’s arbitration
agreement. The court cited Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Lifshutz, 595 So. 2d 996 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) for the proposition that “the fact that customer has other accounts as
matter of law is insufficient to bind customer to arbitration in dispute over account on
which customer had not signed.” Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Halliday, 873 So. 2d 400,
402 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
210 Besser v. Miller, 785 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div. 2004).
211 Id.
212 See In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d 884, 888 (Sur. Ct. 2006).
213 Schmitz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 939 N.E.2d 40, 44-45 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2010).
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When the mother died, the father served for a time as sole trustee. In
that capacity he signed two client relationship agreements that contained arbitration clauses. When the father remarried, he amended the
trust to name his new wife as co-trustee. The new wife continued to
serve as sole trustee after the father died. The new wife signed a similar
agreement with Merrill Lynch, which also contained an arbitration
clause.214 As sole trustee, the new wife made a number of unauthorized
withdrawals from the trust that depleted the trust assets substantially.215
The beneficiaries sued Merrill Lynch for breach of fiduciary duty and
professional negligence in allowing the unauthorized withdrawals. The
court found that the trustee did not act as agent for the beneficiary and
thus had no power to subject the beneficiary to liability in contract or in
tort.216 Further, the court noted that the beneficiaries had no control
over the trustees or the management of the trust assets, and consequently, they had no contractual relationship with Merrill Lynch.217 The
court also concluded that the language of the arbitration agreements did
not evince any intent to directly benefit the beneficiaries and thus that
they could not be bound as third party beneficiaries to the customer
agreement and the arbitration clause contained therein.218
As noted earlier in this article, in August, 2014, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana decided two cases in
the span of seven days and reached opposite conclusions as to whether
non-signatories to an arbitration agreement could be compelled to arbitration.219 On August 15, 2014, in Gupta v. Merrill Lynch,220 the court
refused to compel trust beneficiaries who had not signed account management agreements to arbitrate their claims against Merrill Lynch and
one of its employees. The employee had aided Mr. Gupta in wealth
management planning for the benefit of Mr. Gupta’s sons.221 One
mechanism that was put into place was a revocable trust established by
Mr. Gupta’s aunt that would benefit the sons and his wife when the aunt
died. Merrill Lynch managed the funds in the trust for over a decade.222
When the aunt died, Mr. Gupta informed the employee at which point
the employee forged documents that caused $300,000 to be transferred
from the trust account to another Merrill Lynch account. Despite repeated requests the employee refused to liquidate the account so Mr.
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id.
See discussion of the Warren case supra notes 144, 150-63 and accompanying text.
Gupta v. Merrill Lynch, No. 12–1787, 2014 WL 4063831 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2014).
Gupta, 2014 WL 4063831, at *1.
Id.
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Gupta and his family filed a lawsuit. In conjunction with Merrill Lynch’s
management of his family’s funds, Mr. Gupta had set up several accounts with Merrill Lynch and had signed account agreements that contained arbitration clauses.223 The district court applied federal law to
determine whether Mr. Gupta’s sons should be forced to arbitrate their
claims against Merrill Lynch.224 The bulk of the court’s discussion revolved around whether the sons would be forced to arbitrate under either the equitable estoppel theory or the third-party beneficiary
theory.225 In discussing the estoppel theory, the court examined
whether the beneficiaries had “embraced the contract despite their nonsignatory status.”226 The court stated that a nonsignatory could be
found to have “embraced” the contract in one of two ways: either by
“knowingly seeking and obtaining ‘direct benefits’ from that contract,”
or by “seeking to enforce the terms of that contract or asserting claims
that must be determined by reference to that contract.”227 As to the
first, the court found no evidence that the trust beneficiaries even knew
of the arbitration agreement and thus they could not “knowingly exploit” it.228 As to the second, the court determined that the sons’ claims
stemmed from the Merrill Lynch employee’s actions and thus that the
contracts that contained the arbitration agreements were “largely irrelevant to establishing liability.”229 Additionally, the court pointed out
that the beneficiaries had not obtained any benefits from the trust because, at the time the complaint was filed, the trust remained “unliquidated.”230 In its examination of whether the third-party beneficiary
223 These arbitration clauses were broad and applied to “all controversies which may
arise” between Merrill Lynch and its customer. Id. at *2, *5. The court did compel Mr.
Gupta (and, in some cases, his wife) to arbitrate their claims as they had in fact been
signatories to some of the agreements with Merrill Lynch that contained the arbitration
clauses.
224 The court discussed whether state law or federal law should be used to resolve the
question and decided in favor of applying federal law. Id. at *3. The court noted that the
Fifth Circuit had applied six theories to determine whether a nonsignatory could be
bound to an arbitration agreement: “(1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3)
agency; (4) alter ego; (5) estoppel; and (6) third-party beneficiary.” Id.
225 The court engaged in this discussion when to determine whether the sons should
be bound by an arbitration clause in a “cash management agreement” that had been
signed by an entity, Fiduciary Services, Ltd., on behalf of the trust. Id. at *3-4. The court
then referred back to this discussion in a later part of the opinion in which it determined
that the sons were not bound by arbitration agreements that appeared in IRA and Custodial Agreements that had been signed by their father.
226 Id. at *4.
227 Id. (citing Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 469, 473 (5th
Cir.2010)).
228 Id.
229 Id. at *5.
230 Id. at *4.
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theory could be used to compel the nonsignatories to arbitration, the
court stated that “the dispositive inquiry is whether ‘the intent to make
someone a third-party beneficiary is clearly written or evidenced in the
contract.’”231 The court looked at one of the agreements that contained
an arbitration clause and noted that it did not mention the sons by name
or otherwise indicate a clear intent to benefit them. The court also
noted that the Fifth Circuit usually only compelled arbitration under the
third-party beneficiary theory in cases in which the party trying to compel the arbitration was the nonsignatory party.232
In December, 2014, the Supreme Court of Mississippi refused to
force an arbitration in a case in which the arbitration agreement in question expressly excluded nonsignatories to the agreement. Because of
this express exclusion there was no need for the court to explore other
theories that might cause the plaintiffs to be bound by the arbitration
agreement. Nevertheless, the defendants in this case raised these theories and the court’s opinion refuted them. The plaintiffs in Pinnacle
Trust Co., LLC v. McTaggart233 (hereinafter Pinnacle) were the beneficiaries of a trust set up in the will of Billie D. Bracato. Upon being
appointed trustee, Pinnacle Trust Co., LLC (“Pinnacle”) entered into a
“Wealth-Management Agreement” (“WMA”) with EFP, Inc. (“EFP”)
in order to allow EFP to provide asset-management services for the
trust.234 The WMA contained an arbitration agreement and also contained a section entitled “Third Party Beneficiaries” which provided
that, “This Agreement does not and is not intended to confer any rights
or remedies upon any person or entity other than the signatories.”235
The only signatories to the WMA were the “Pinnacle Trust Company
FBO Billie B. Bracato Family Trust”236 and EFP. The plaintiffs claimed
that, over the course of four years, the mismanagement and improper
investment of the trust assets by Pinnacle and EFP had resulted in a loss
to the trust of over $1,500,000.237 Pinnacle and EFP tried to force the
plaintiffs to arbitrate their claim under the theory that the plaintiffs
were “direct beneficiaries” of the WMA. The defendants based their
claim on the fact that the plaintiffs were direct beneficiaries of the trust
and the WMA was entered into for the exclusive benefit of the trust.238
231 Id. at *5 (quoting Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 362 (5th
Cir.2003)).
232 Id.
233 Pinnacle Trust Co. v. McTaggart, 152 So. 3d 1123 (Miss. 2014).
234 Pinnacle, 152 So. 3d at 1125.
235 Id.
236 The court noted in a footnote that “FBO stood for “for the benefit of.” Id. at
1125 n.3.
237 Id. at 1125.
238 Id. at 1126.
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While acknowledging the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, the
Mississippi court began by noting that requiring nonsignatories to be
bound by arbitration agreements occurred only in “rare circumstances.”239 The court stated that its determination of whether the instant case was one of these “rare circumstances” boiled down to a
determination whether “a direct beneficiary of a Trust automatically becomes a direct beneficiary of an agreement entered into for its benefit
but to which it is not a party, or whether it is simply a third-party beneficiary.”240 The court discussed this question in the context of the “directbenefit estoppel” theory, which the court found revolved around
whether a party has “embrac[ed] the benefits of a contract while simultaneously trying to avoid its burdens. . . .”241 The court found that the
plaintiffs’ claims were not directly dependent upon the WMA but rather
on Mississippi trust law and that the fact that the plaintiffs were “direct
and residual beneficiaries of the Trust” did not “make them anything
other than third-party beneficiaries of the WMA” who were explicitly
excluded by the terms of the WMA.242
III. ENFORCEABILITY OF TRUSTEE PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS – THE THEORIES
“[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he had not agreed so
to submit.”243 Because arbitration agreements are contractual in nature,
the courts apply “ordinary principles of contract and agency” to determine the circumstances under which nonsignatories can be bound.244 As
discussed in Part II, supra, while the majority of courts that have ex239

Id. at 1128.
Id.
241 Id. at 1129.
242 Id.
243 AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).
244 Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995).
Section 2 of the FAA invokes general contract theory:
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof,
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added). In a case involving both Egyptian and American
law, the court noted that an “American nonsignatory cannot be bound to arbitrate in the
absence of a full showing of facts supporting an articulable theory based on American
contract law or American agency law.” Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 662
(2d Cir. 2005).
240
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amined whether nonsignatory trust beneficiaries can be bound to arbitration agreements signed by the trustee have determined that
beneficiaries are bound by the arbitration provision, the courts have
used a variety of overlapping theories to reach this conclusion. Additionally, the courts have not consistently applied the same labels to
these theories, which renders difficult the task of making precise distinctions among them. However, for the sake of this discussion in this article, the theories will be divided into the following categories: (A)
estoppel theory; (B) third party beneficiary theory; (C) agency theory;
(D) assignee and successor trustee theory; and (E) presumption in favor
of arbitration. The estoppel theory and the presumption in favor of arbitration have appeared most often in the cases in which the courts have
compelled arbitration while the third party beneficiary theory and the
agency theory have been discussed by the courts that have refused to
compel arbitration.
A. Estoppel Theory
A general statement of the first theory for compelling nonsignatories to arbitrate, which is sometimes referred to as “equitable estoppel,”
is that a person cannot assert a claim that is based on an agreement
while simultaneously seeking to disavow a portion of the agreement.245
In the cases at issue here, the courts basically have stated that a beneficiary cannot bring an action against a financial services institution that is
based on the account agreement with that institution and, at the same
time, claim that the arbitration provision in the agreement is not binding. The application of the theory was described in Green,246 the case in
which the beneficiary of a special needs trust, Ms. Green, attempted to
sue both the bank in which trust funds had been deposited and the
trust’s investment adviser when she discovered that the trust funds had
been almost completely exhausted.247 The court compelled the beneficiary to arbitrate these claims, rather than pursue them in court, stating,
To the extent Ms. Green’s claims are based on the agreements that Mr. Green [the trustee] had with Regions Bank and
245 Some courts use the term “equitable estoppel” to apply both to the estoppel theory described herein as “equitable estoppel” and to what is sometimes referred to as the
“inextricably intertwined” test that is described later in this section. See, e.g., Brown v
Pac. Life Ins. Co, 462 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 2006); Meyer v. WMCO-GP LLC, 211
S.W.3d 302, 305 (Tex. 2006). Other courts refer to the second theory as an “alternate
estoppel theory.” See, e.g., Tobel v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. 298129, 2012 WL
555801, at *10 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2012).
246 Green v. Regions Bank, No. 2013 CA 0771, 2014 WL 3555820, at *6 (La. Ct. App.
Mar. 19, 2014).
247 Id. at *1.
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Morgan Keegan, she cannot hold these parties to certain terms
of the agreements but not to others. If a nonsignatory seeks to
enforce the terms of an agreement containing an arbitration
provision, he must accept all the terms of the agreement, including the arbitration provision. In other words, he cannot
seek to enforce specific terms of the agreement while seeking
to avoid enforcement of the arbitration provision. The non-signatory cannot have it both ways; he cannot seek to enforce the
agreement when it works to his advantage and then repudiate
the agreement when it works to his disadvantage.248
The Court of Appeals of Colorado in the Smith case found that the
beneficiaries “are estopped from avoiding the arbitration provisions in
the account agreements because they are seeking to invoke the duties
the investment company allegedly owed them as a result of the signature
of its representative on the account documents.”249 Versions of the estoppel theory were also invoked by the Eddings, Gardner, Ventura,
Blumenkrantz, Warren, and Gupta courts.250
In applying the estoppel theory, the courts employ a number of different overlapping tests to determine whether the beneficiary is estopped from claiming that he or she is not bound by the arbitration
agreement. Some courts look to see whether the account agreement is
the “underlying basis” for the beneficiaries’ claims. Others focus on
whether the beneficiary is receiving a “direct benefit” from the agreement. Still others may hold nonsignatories to an arbitration agreement
using the “inextricably intertwined” test.
Underlying Basis: The Eddings case illustrates an application of the
underlying basis test. In this case, both the settlor of the trust and the
trust beneficiaries alleged that they should not be bound by the arbitration provision in the account agreement with Merrill Lynch that was
signed by a successor trustee.251 The Court of Appeals of Texas disagreed. The court found that “the account agreement is the underlying
basis for all of the claims; they would have no claims had the account
agreement never been signed by the trustee.”252 In Gardner, in which
the settlor-beneficiary sued the trustee and the broker with whom the
248

Id. at *6-7.
Smith v. Multi-Fin. Sec. Corp., 171 P.3d 1267, 1272 (Colo. App. 2007).
250 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Eddings (Eddings), 838 S.W.2d 874, 879
(Tex. App. 1992); In re Jean F. Gardner Amended Blind Trust (In re Gardner), 70 P.3d
168, 170 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Ventura, 907 So. 2d 1035, 1042
(Ala. 2005); In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d 884, 888 (Sur. Ct. 2006); Warren v. Geller,
No. 11-2282, 2014 WL 4186482 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2014).
251 Eddings, 838 S.W.2d at 878.
252 Id. at 879.
249
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trustee had contracted for investment advice, the Court of Appeals of
Washington noted that the beneficiary’s claims were for imprudent and
negligent investment of the trust assets.253 The court concluded that the
beneficiary’s “claims arise directly out of transactions made pursuant to
the investment account agreement” and thus the beneficiaries were
bound by the arbitration agreement.254
The underlying basis test does not preclude cases that include both
claims that arise under the account agreement and claims that relate to
duties that stem from some other source, such as the trust instrument. In
Smith, the beneficiaries asserted that the investment company had failed
to prevent the trustee from making investments that were unsuitable for
the trust. The beneficiaries also claimed that the trustee had made inappropriate disbursements to himself.255 The account agreement that the
trustee had signed contained arbitration provisions that applied to controversies about “the construction, performance, or breach of [the]
agreement” as well as controversies “arising out of or relating to [the]
account” and “transactions with or for [the client].”256 The court compelled the beneficiaries to arbitrate the case even though some of their
allegations involved breaches of fiduciary duty “arising out of and relating to the trust instrument” rather than arising out of the account.257
As noted supra in Part II, the Clark case is one of the six cases in
which the court did not favor forcing the beneficiaries to arbitrate their
disputes.258 The Clark court’s conclusion in part revolved around the
finding that the beneficiaries’ claims were not based on and did not arise
from the account agreement.259 The court rejected Merrill Lynch’s claim
that it owed no fiduciary duty to the beneficiary outside the terms of the
account agreement.260 The court seemed to presume that Merrill
Lynch’s fiduciary duties arose from some other source. However, it did
253

See In re Gardner, 70 P.3d at 170.
Id.
255 Smith, 171 P.3d at 1269.
256 Id. at 1271.
257 Id.
258 See generally supra text accompanying notes 188-201. See also Clark v. Clark, 57
P.3d 95, 99 (Okla. 2002).
259 Clark, 57 P.3d at 99.
260 See Id. at 98. In contrast, see the statement in In re Blumenkrantz: “[I]f the objectant has a claim against Wachovia Securities for breach of fiduciary or other duty, it
arose from the customer agreement and she cannot simultaneously assert a claim against
Wachovia based on the agreement and seek to repudiate the arbitration clause in the
agreement.” In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d 884, 888 (Sur. Ct. 2006). Also, in Edward
D. Jones & Co. v. Ventura, the plaintiff alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the brokerage
firms. Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Ventura, 907 So. 2d 1035, 1038 (Ala. 2005). The court
found that the plaintiff “must rely on or refer to the investment agreements to establish
his breach-of-fiduciary-duty, fraud, and suppression claims. Therefore, his claims arise
254

314

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:273

not name that source.261 The court noted that the facts of a case rather
than the terms of a contract govern whether a fiduciary duty exists between the parties.262 In Gupta, another case in which the court did not
compel the nonsignatories to arbitrate, the federal district court focused
on the underlying basis of the beneficiaries’ claims and found that their
claims were not related to the management agreement that contained
the arbitration clause.263 The court determined that the beneficiaries’
claims revolved around the inappropriate actions of one of Merrill
Lynch’s employees and thus that the management agreement was
“largely irrelevant to establishing liability.”264 Similarly, in Pinnacle, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi refused to force the nonsignatories to arbitrate, stating that their claim was not based on a breach of the agreement that contained the arbitration clause but rather on the duty
imposed by statute on trustees to handle and invest trust assets
prudently.265
Direct Benefit Estoppel: Another component of the estoppel theory
is the question of whether a beneficiary has received a direct benefit
from the agreement in which the arbitration provision is contained; if so,
the beneficiary cannot then refuse to enter into arbitration. This theory
is sometimes referred to as “direct benefit estoppel.”266 Courts that apply this theory distinguish between whether the plaintiff received a “direct” or only an “indirect” benefit as a result of the agreement. The
Supreme Court of Texas examined this theory in the trust context in In
Re Weekley Homes, LP (a case that did not involve a financial services
institution).267 In this case, a father contracted with Weekley Homes for
the construction of a house.268 The agreement between the father and
the construction company included an arbitration provision.269 When
the house was completed, the father transferred it to his revocable family trust.270 The father and his daughter were the only trustees of the
trust and the daughter was the sole beneficiary following her father’s
death.271 Throughout the construction the daughter often dealt directly
out of the investment agreements for purposes of the motions to compel arbitration . . . .”
Id. at 1042.
261 Clark, 57 P.3d at 98.
262 Id.
263 Gupta v. Merrill Lynch, No. 12–1787, 2014 WL 4063831, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 15,
2014).
264 Id. at *5.
265 Pinnacle Trust Co. v. McTaggart, 152 So. 3d 1123, 1129 (Miss. 2014).
266 See, e.g., In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 739-40 (Tex. 2005).
267 In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2005).
268 Id. at 129.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
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with Weekley.272 At some point, the daughter sued Weekley, claiming
that defects in the construction had caused her to contract asthma.273
Weekley invoked the arbitration clause, but the trial court refused to
order the daughter to arbitration, as she was not a party to the arbitration agreement.274 The daughter also asserted that her claim was a noncontractual personal injury claim and thus not one that was based on the
contract in which the arbitration provision appeared.275 The Supreme
Court of Texas disagreed.276 The Supreme Court stated that “whether a
claim seeks a direct benefit from a contract containing an arbitration
clause turns on the substance of the claim, not artful pleading.”277 The
court focused not on the nature of the daughter’s pleading but rather on
her conduct during the course of the contract.278 The court found that
she had exerted control in her dealings with Weekley and that Weekley
had complied.279 The court concluded that because the daughter “deliberately sought substantial and direct benefits from the contract, and
Weekley agreed to comply, equity prevents her from avoiding the arbitration clause that was part of that agreement.”280
In the Ventura case, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that a
ward would be bound by the arbitration agreements contained in contracts entered into by the conservator and two brokerage firms.281 Without discussion, the court stated simply that because the ward’s “claims
arise out of the manner in which the investment accounts were managed
or should have been managed, he is seeking the benefits of the investment agreements entered into by [the conservator].”282 In Warren, the
district court noted that the court must look at the parties’ conduct after
the contract in question has been questioned in order to determine
whether the plaintiff is estopped by virtue of having accepted benefits
under the contract.283 The court noted that the plaintiff in this case, who
was the beneficiary of a life insurance trust, had admitted to accepting
benefits from Morgan Keegan under the client agreement.284 Thus, the
plaintiff was equitably estopped from challenging the agreement.285
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285

Id.
Id.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 131-32.
Id.
Id. at 132-33.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 134.
Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Ventura, 907 So. 2d 1035, 1042 (Ala. 2005).
Id. at 1042.
Warren v. Geller, No. 11-2282, 2014 WL 4186482, at *14 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2014).
Id.
Id.
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As noted above, some courts have attempted to distinguish between situations in which the beneficiary receives a “direct” benefit
from the underlying agreement as opposed to an “indirect” benefit. In
Thomson-CSF v. American Arbitration Association, the court held that a
nonsignatory may be bound to an arbitration agreement under an estoppel theory when the nonsignatory seeks a direct benefit from the contract while disavowing the arbitration provision.286 However, when only
an indirect benefit is sought, only a signatory may be estopped from
avoiding arbitration.287 The concept of “direct,” as opposed to “indirect,” benefits overlaps substantially with the “third party beneficiary”
theory that is discussed below and that was invoked by the Halliday
court when it refused to compel the beneficiary to arbitrate.288
In Comer v. Micor, Inc., an ERISA case289 that was cited heavily in
the Larson case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit added another element to the “direct benefits” theory, stating that a beneficiary
must “knowingly exploit” the benefits of the agreement that contains
the arbitration provision.290 The court in that case did not compel the
plan participants (who were beneficiaries of the trust that held the pension plan assets) to arbitrate.291 The court characterized the beneficiaries as “passive participants” in trusts managed by others for their
benefit.292 In contrast, the Larson court found that the trust beneficiaries were not unaware of the attorney-client agreement containing
the arbitration provision, and that they had directed the trustee to hire
an attorney and discuss their claims with that attorney.293
In Pinnacle,294 on the other hand, the Mississippi Supreme Court
(which refused to compel arbitration) approached the direct benefit estoppel question not by focusing on the distinction between “direct” and
“indirect” benefits but rather on the question whether the plaintiffs
were direct beneficiaries of the Wealth Management Agreement
(WMA) that contained the arbitration clause sheerly because they were
286
287
288

Thomson-CSF v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 779.
Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Halliday, 873 So. 2d 400, 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2004).
289 Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008). ERISA cases are generally beyond the scope of this article.
290 Id. at 1101. It should be noted that, although the Clark court did not mention
direct benefits estoppel in its opinion, it appeared to be influenced heavily by the fact
that the beneficiary had no knowledge of the agreement that trustee had entered into
with Merrill Lynch. See Clark v. Clark, 57 P.3d 95, 99 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); Larson v.
Speetjens, No. C05-3176 SBA, 2006 WL 2567873, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2006).
291 Comer, 436 F.3d at 1103-04.
292 Id at 1102.
293 Larson, 2006 WL 2567873, at *6.
294 Pinnacle Trust Co. v. McTaggart, 152 So. 3d 1123 (Miss. 2014).
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direct beneficiaries of the trust.295 The court noted first that the plaintiffs had not “embraced” the WMA because they did not even know of
its existence.296 Second, the court found that the plaintiffs’ claims
against the trustee and the trust advisor for breach of fiduciary duty
were claims that arose under Mississippi statutory law and thus were not
directly dependent upon the WMA.297 The plaintiffs, who were not parties to the WMA (and who were explicitly excluded by the terms of the
WMA) “neither sought to enfore the terms of the WMA. . . nor are
their claims dependent upon its existence.”298 Thus, the direct benefits
estoppel theory was inapplicable to them.
Inextricably Intertwined Test: Closely related to the “equitable estoppel” theory described above is what is sometime called the “inextricably intertwined” or “inherently inseparable” test. This test focuses on
the relationships among the parties and their conduct and has been used
primarily by courts to allow nonsignatories to compel signatories to arbitrate. Although some courts have made reference to this test in the
trustee cases, they usually have not found the need to apply it.299 One
exception is the Tobel case.300 One question in this case was whether the
insurance company, which had not signed the arbitration agreement,
could compel the plaintiffs (who included signatories and their assignees) to arbitrate.301 The brothers and the trustees claimed that the insurance company could not compel them to arbitrate because it had not
been a party to the agreement.302 The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s order requiring the plaintiffs to submit all of their
claims to arbitration.303 On the question of whether the insurance company could compel arbitration, the court noted that the trustees were
both signatories to the insurance policies that had been brokered by the
financial services company and that the plaintiffs’ complaint asserted
concerted conduct by the financial services company and the insurance
company.304
295

Id. at 1128.
Id. at 1129.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 See, e.g., Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Ventura, 907 So. 2d 1035, 1040 (Ala. 2005).
The Larson court noted that the trust beneficiaries’ claims against the attorney were “inextricably intertwined” with the attorney-client agreement that contained the arbitration
provision. Larson, 2006 WL 2567873, at *7.
300 Tobel v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. 298129, 2012 WL 555801, at *1 (Mich.
Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2012).
301 Id. at *8.
302 Id. at *1.
303 Id. at *12.
304 Id. at *8. The court also relied to some extent on the theories that (1) the insurance company was an agent of the financial services company and (2) “incorporation by
296
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In Larson, in its discussion of the application of the estoppel theory,
the court found that the claims of the trustees were “inextricably intertwined” with the attorney-client agreement because their claims were
based on a breach of the fiduciary duty that was created by the
agreement.305
B. Third Party Beneficiary Theory
As a general rule, courts accept that nonsignatories may be compelled to arbitrate if they are third party beneficiaries of the agreement
that contains the arbitration provision.306 In Ventura, the Supreme
Court of Alabama held that a ward would be bound by arbitration
agreements contained in contracts entered into by the conservator and
two brokerage firms.307 Without discussion, the court stated simply that
the ward would be bound to the predispute arbitration agreement because the ward was “a third party beneficiary of the accounts” and was
asserting claims relating to the management of the investment accounts.308 In Warren, the federal district court, applying Louisiana law,
discussed this theory in more detail. The court began by articulating the
three elements of third-party beneficiary theory: “a stipulation in favor
of the third-party that is manifestly clear; a certainty as to the benefit
provided to the third party; and that the benefit was not a mere incident
of the contract between the parties.”309 The “contract” at issue in this
case was a client agreement between the trustee of a life insurance trust
and Morgan Keegan.310 As to the first element, the court noted that
“the account belonged to a trust, which by definition means that there
reference” occurred because the arbitration agreement expressly applied to successors of
the other original signatories. See id.
305 See Larson v. Speetjens, No. C05-3176 SBA, 2006 WL 2567873, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 5, 2006).
306 See, e.g., Washington Square Sec., Inc. v. Aune, 385 F.3d 432, 434-35 (4th Cir.
2004); John Hancock Life Ins., Co. v. Wilson, 254 F.3d 48, 58 (2d Cir. 2001).
307 Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Ventura, 907 So. 2d 1035, 1037, 1041-42 (Ala. 2005).
The conservator was not a party to the reported lawsuit but apparently had been sued
separately when the ward discovered that the $500,000 wrongful death award that he had
received at age eighteen had been dissipated completely by the time he reached the age
of majority. See id. at 1041-42. The Ventura court engaged in extensive discussion as to
the whether the conservator had the authority to enter into the agreements with the
brokerage firm and concluded that she did have that authority. Id. at 1041.
308 Id. In Blumenkrantz the plaintiff claimed that she was a third party beneficiary of
the contract but was not bound by the arbitration provision. In re Blumenkrantz, 824
N.Y.S.2d 884, 884 (Sur. Ct. 2006). This may have been a typographical error in the court’s
opinion. See id.
309 Warren v. Geller, No. 11-2282, 2014 WL 4186482, at *13 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2014)
(citing Joseph v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2 of Parish of St. Mary, 939 So.2d 1206, 1212
(2006)).
310 Id.
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was a third-party beneficiary.”311 As to the second element, the court
pointed out that the client agreement articulated the specific benefit
that would be paid out to the trust beneficiary under the trust.312 As to
the third element, the court stated that these benefits were “the sole
reason for creating the Trust” and thus were not benefits that were
merely incidental to the trust.313 Without elaboration, the court also
found that “the facts indicate that the parties to the contract intended to
create a third-beneficiary [sic] to the contract.”314
Those courts that have not compelled a beneficiary to arbitrate
have relied at least in part on the inapplicability of third party beneficiary theory. The third party beneficiary theory resembles closely the direct benefit estoppel theory described above. However, while the direct
benefit estoppel theory focuses on the receipt of the benefit, the third
party beneficiary theory focuses on the parties’ intent. The third party
beneficiary theory was described in the Halliday case as follows:
The rules as to third party beneficiaries are these. Unless a
person is a party to a contract, that person may not sue-or, for
that matter, be sued-for breach of that contract where the nonparty has received only an incidental or consequential benefit
of the contract. There is an exception when the non-party is
specifically the intended third party beneficiary of the contract.
A non-party is the specifically intended beneficiary only if the
contract clearly expresses an intent to primarily and directly
benefit the third party or a class of persons to which that party
belongs. To find the requisite intent, it must be established that
the parties to the contract actually and expressly intended to
benefit the third party; it is not sufficient to show only that one
of the contracting parties unilaterally intended some benefit to
the third party.315
In Halliday, the Florida court refused to use third-party beneficiary theory to compel the nonsignatory trust beneficiary to arbitration, finding
the application of the theory to be “fraught with miscalculation and unfairness.”316 The court began its discussion by noting that the question
of whether a person is a third party beneficiary of a contract revolves
311

Id.
Id. The account agreement stated that a payment of $4000 per month was to be
received by the beneficiaries of the trust. Id.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Halliday, 873 So. 2d 400, 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (citations omitted).
316 Id. at 403-04. The court stated, “Maybe the attempt to metamorphose plaintiff
into a third party beneficiary of this arbitration agreement really masks an attempt to
312
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around intent.317 While recognizing that the trust assets were to be used
for the benefit of the beneficiary, the court found no evidence that the
account agreement entered into by the trustee (and, most particularly,
the arbitration provision of that agreement) were intended for the “primary and direct benefit” of the beneficiary.318 The court even speculated as to the true purpose of the account agreement:
For all we know from this bare bones motion and the
above documents, the customer account agreement was more
than likely primarily for the benefit of the Trustees. They may
have thought that in relieving themselves of making the daily
investment decisions for the management of those assets they
could thereby lessen their personal culpability for mismanagement. We note that the Trustees are individuals related to the
decedent from whose estate the QTIP trust was established to
perform the promise of a prenuptial agreement. Perhaps these
family Trustees are untrained or inexperienced in managing
such assets.319
This language is reminiscent of the conclusion by the Clark court (a
court that also refused to compel the beneficiary to arbitration) that the
account agreement entered into between the trustee and Merrill Lynch
was “the personal undertaking of” the trustee.320
In Schmitz, another case in which the court refused to enforce the
arbitration agreement, the court said that the very words of the account
agreements indicated that the beneficiaries were not intended to be the
third party beneficiaries of the agreements.321 The agreement defined
the pronouns used in the agreement (“I,” “me,” “you”) to refer only to
the person who signed the agreement.322 The court concluded that there
clearly was no provision in the agreements indicating intent that the
beneficiaries be third party beneficiaries.323 In Besser, the New York
Surrogate’s Court simply invoked the third party beneficiary theory
without labeling it as such and refused to compel the beneficiary to
arbitrate.324
make the Trustees the agent for plaintiff when they entered into the customer account
agreement.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
317 Id. at 403.
318 Id. at 402-03.
319 Id. at 405.
320 See Clark v. Clark, 57 P.3d 95, 99 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).
321 Schmitz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 939 N.E.2d 40, 45 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2010).
322 Id.
323 Id. at 44-45.
324 Besser v. Miller, 785 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div. 2004).
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In Gupta, the federal district court found that the beneficiaries of
the trust were not third party beneficiaries of the account management
agreement between the trust and Merrill Lynch.325 The Gupta court focused on the parties’ intent as it related to the management agreement.
The court noted that the management agreement did not “evince the
requisite clear intent to benefit” the trust beneficiaries.326 The trust
beneficiaries were not named in the management agreement and, while
they might benefit from the existence of the agreement, this benefit was
“not enough to overcome the presumption that the parties are contracting for themselves only.”327
In Pinnacle, the Supreme Court of Mississippi took an entirely different approach to the third party beneficiary theory. In this case, the
court found that the plaintiffs’ status as third party beneficiaries dictated
that they not be bound by the arbitration agreement.328 The court said
that the plaintiffs “are, in fact, direct and residual beneficiaries of the
Trust but, nonetheless, that does not make them anything more than
third party beneficiaries of the [asset management agreement], as they
were not parties to it.”329 It is important to recall that in this case the
agreement contained a section entitled “Third Party Beneficiaries”
which stated that the agreement “does not and is not intended to confer
any rights or remedies upon any person or entity other than the
signatories.”330
Another interesting twist in the third party beneficiary theory occurred in the Shahan case.331 In this case, the roles were reversed in that
it was the beneficiary, rather than the securities broker, who sought to
compel arbitration.332 The beneficiary argued that the broker was
bound by section 12(a) of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure
(“the Code”), which provides that, when a dispute arises between a
member and a customer in connection with that member’s business, the
member is required to arbitrate if the customer so demands.333 The broker, in turn, argued that the beneficiary was not his “customer” and that
the only person who could compel him to arbitrate was the trustee.334
The court concluded that the beneficiary was the “intended third party
325

Gupta v. Merrill Lynch, No. 12–1787, 2014 WL 4063831, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 15,

2014).
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334

Id.
Id.
Pinnacle Trust Co. v. McTaggart, 152 So. 3d 1123, 1128-29 (Miss. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 1125.
See Shahan v. Staley, 932 P.2d 1345 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1347-48.
Id. at 1348.

322

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:273

beneficiary of the trust agreement between the trustee and [the broker]”
and could thus compel the broker to arbitrate.335
C. Agency Theory
As noted above, courts apply “ordinary principals of contract and
agency law” to determine whether a nonsignatory can be bound by an
arbitration agreement.336 In Javitch v. First Union Securities, Inc., the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that an agency relationship
between parties may be a basis for requiring a nonsignatory to participate in arbitration.337 So in cases that involve an account agreement that
has been signed by the trustee, the question that arises is whether the
beneficiary can be bound because the trustee was acting as the beneficiary’s agent. The courts that have addressed this issue have uniformly
rejected the notion that the trustee is the beneficiary’s agent, even
though some of these courts have compelled arbitration under a different theory.338
In Halliday, a case in which the court refused to compel the beneficiary to arbitration,339 the court said definitively that the trustees were
not agents of the beneficiary:
The Trustees are fiduciaries for plaintiff, not established
agents. Their role is to manage the Trust assets for the benefit
of those entitled to share in the Trust assets, both the income
and the principal. That the Trustees may engage the services of
an expert in managing Trust assets to assist them in the performance of their fiduciary responsibilities hardly makes them
agents of the Trust beneficiary in order to bind her personally
335

Id.
See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
337 Javitch v First Union Sec., Inc, 315 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 2003). The agency
theory is often invoked when a defendant in a case resists arbitration on the ground that
he, she, or it did not sign an arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Thomas v. Westlake, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 114, 120 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Dryer v. L.A. Rams, 709 P.2d 826, 834 (Cal.
1985); RN Solution, Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare W., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 892, 900 (Ct. App.
2008); 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533, 539 (Ct. App. 1998)).
Courts allow the plaintiff to compel arbitration if it is shown that the defendant acted as
an agent of one who signed the arbitration agreement. Thomas, 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 120121.
338 See Larson v. Speetjens, No. C 05-3176 SBA, 2006 WL 2567873, at *8 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2006). The Larson court found that the trustee was acting in her individual capacity rather than her fiduciary capacity when she signed the attorney-client agreement and that the beneficiaries had authorized her to be their sole contact with the
attorneys and to hire these attorneys to represent them. Id. Thus, the court found that the
beneficiaries were bound by the arbitration agreement under agency theory. Id.
339 Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Halliday, 873 So. 2d 400, 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
336
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to their hiring of that assistance or to their purported waiver of
her right of access to a court to seek redress for loss occasioned
thereby.340
The Clark court, which also refused to compel arbitration,341 noted the
following distinction between a trustee and an agent:
When an agent contracts in the name of his principal, the principal contracts, and is bound, but the agent is not. When a trustee contracts as such, unless he is bound, no one is bound, for
he has no principal. The trust estate cannot promise; the contract is therefore the personal undertaking of the trustee.342
The Clark holding was based in part on the court’s finding that the trustee was not the beneficiary’s agent.343
The Gardner court, which did not relieve the beneficiary from the
obligation to arbitrate, basically agreed with the Clark court’s finding
that a trustee is not an agent of the beneficiary.344 The Gardner court
looked to the Restatement (Second) of Agency to determine the answer
to this question.345 The Gardner court quoted comments (f) and (g) to
section 14B of the Restatement:
“Where a person transfers property to another, the question whether there is an agency depends upon the amount of
control agreed to be exercised by the person for whose benefit
the transferee is to act, or, in doubtful situations, upon the
amount of control in fact exercised.” Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 14B cmt. f (1958). Thus, “if a trustee is not an agent,
he has no power to bind the beneficiary by contract or otherwise . . . although he can subject the trust property to a claim
based upon a tort, a contract, or a restitution duty.” Restatement (Second) of Agency, supra, cmt. g.346
The Gardner court noted that the trust at issue in the case was a “blind
trust” and thus that the trustee, over whose actions the beneficiary had
no control, could not be deemed to be an agent of the beneficiary.347
340

Id. at 403.
Clark v. Clark, 57 P.3d 95, 99 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).
342 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ridell v. Stuart, 2 P.2d 929, 932
(Okla. 1931) (quoting Taylor v. Davis, 110 U.S. 330, 334-35 (1884))).
343 Id.
344 See In re Jean F. Gardner Amended Blind Trust, 70 P.3d 168, 170 (Wash. App.
2003).
345 Id.
346 Id. at 170, n.10.
347 Id. at 170.
341
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The issue of control was also discussed by the court in Schmitz
when it refused to compel arbitration.348 The Schmitz court noted that
the beneficiaries had no control over the management of the trust and
thus the trustee was not acting as their agent.349 However, the court did
cite an earlier Illinois case, Kessler, Merci, & Lochner, Inc. v. Pioneer
Bank & Trust Co., for the proposition that if “the beneficiaries retain
control over the trustee and the management of the business in relation
thereto, a different result is warranted . . . . The trustee is regarded as
the agent of the beneficiaries and they will be liable upon his contracts.”350 In the Kessler, Merci, & Lochner, Inc. case, one of the beneficiaries of a land trust, at the direction of the other beneficiaries,
negotiated an architectural services contract that contained an arbitration provision.351 The beneficiaries directed the trustee to sign the contract.352 The contract also provided that all representations made by the
trustee “are those of the trustee’s beneficiary only.”353 The court found
ample evidence that the trustee was acting as the beneficiaries’ agent
and thus that the beneficiaries were bound by the contract, including the
arbitration provision.354 In Warren, the federal district court, even
though it eventually compelled the plaintiff to arbitrate based upon
other theories, rejected the argument that the plaintiff was bound to
arbitrate merely because the trustee had signed the client agreement in
his capacity as trustee of the life insurance trust.355 The court noted that
the agency theory applied only when a trustee is subject to the beneficiaries’ control and stated that the defendants had not shown any facts
that indicated that the beneficiaries in this particular case had exercised
control over the trustee.356 The federal district court in Gupta also rejected the agency theory, using the same reasoning as the Warren
court.357

348 See Schmitz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 939 N.E.2d 40, 45 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2010).
349 Id.
350 Id. (citing Kessler, Merci & Lochner, Inc. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 428
N.E.2d 608, 609 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)).
351 See Kessler, 428 N.E.2d at 609.
352 Id.
353 Id. at 609-10.
354 Id. at 611.
355 Warren v. Geller, No. 11-2282, 2014 WL 4186482, at *13 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2014).
356 Id.
357 Gupta v. Merrill Lynch, No. 12–1787, 2014 WL 4063831, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 15,
2014).

Fall/Winter 2014] PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

325

D. Assignee and Successor Trustee Theory
Sometimes the nonsignatory to the account agreement is not a trust
beneficiary but rather an assignee of or a successor to the person who
signed the agreement. Often, account agreements will include clauses
that specifically extend the agreement to the signatory’s successors and
assigns. For example, in Tobel, the account agreement included the following clause regarding successors:
The Client hereby agrees that this Agreement and all terms
thereof shall be binding upon the Client’s heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives and assigns. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of Baird’s present organization
and any successor organization, irrespective of any change or
changes at any time in the personnel thereof, for any cause
whatsoever.358
In Tobel, two brothers entered into a financial services agreement
and, upon the advice of the financial services providers, purchased variable life insurance policies and then assigned the policies to trusts of
which their wives served as trustees.359 In a lawsuit against the financial
services provider and the insurance company, the wives complained
that, as nonsignatories, they could not be bound by the arbitration provision in the account agreement.360 The court disagreed, finding that the
wives as trustees were successors to the original signatories.361
The Court of Appeals of Indiana, in Smith Barney v. StoneMor Operating, LLC, was not willing to interpret broadly a somewhat similar
successors clause.362 In that case, Smith Barney had entered into account agreements with a mortuary company to handle certain cemetery
trust363 accounts. The agreements stated that they would be binding on
the trustees’ “heirs, executors, administrators, assigns or successors in
interest.”364 The agreements contained arbitration provisions.365 The
mortuary company was placed in receivership when it was alleged that it
358 Tobel v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. 298129, 2012 WL 555801, at *7 (Mich.
Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2012).
359 Id. at *1.
360 Id. at *7.
361 Id. at *8. The court referred to this theory obliquely as an “incorporation by reference” theory. Id.
362 See Barney v. StoneMor Operating LLC, 959 N.E.2d 309, 315 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011).
363 See id. at 310. As noted by the court, a cemetery trust was a trust that “that had
been established pursuant to Indiana law to ensure the perpetual upkeep of prepaid burial plots and the delivery of prepaid funeral merchandise and services.” Id.
364 Id. at 311.
365 Id. at 310.
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had stolen millions of dollars from the cemetery trusts.366 The receiver
commenced a suit against Smith Barney, asserting that it had participated in the plundering of the trust funds.367 StoneMor agreed to take
over the business operations of the mortuary company, and Independence Trust was appointed trustee of the existing cemetery trusts and
new trusts set up by StoneMor.368 The receiver assigned his claims
against Smith Barney to StoneMor.369 Smith Barney sought to compel
arbitration pursuant to the account agreements.370 StoneMor and Independence Trust claimed that, as nonsignatories to the account agreement, they were not bound by the arbitration provisions,371 and the
Court of Appeals of Indiana agreed.372 Smith Barney relied primarily
on “fundamental principles of trust law,”373 quoting case law and scholarly commentary to the effect that a successor trustee succeeds to title to
the trust property and is bound by the contractual obligations entered
into by the predecessor trustee.374 The court eschewed the reference to
trust law, stating that arbitration is governed by principles of contract
law.375 The court pointed out that Smith Barney had not offered any
case law from any state to support the application of the trust law principles in the context of arbitration.376 Referring back to the terms of the
account agreements, the court also noted that Independence Trust,
while it might have been a “successor trustee,” was not a “successor in
interest” to the account agreements.377 Although recognizing the strong
state and federal public policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, the court persisted in its insistence that Independence Trust
had not signed the client agreements and thus could not be bound by
them.378

366

Id.
Id.
368 Id.
369 Id.
370 Id.
371 Id. at 311.
372 Id.
373 Id. at 313.
374 Id. at 313-14.
375 Id. at 313.
376 Id. at 314.
377 Id. at 314. The court noted also that the account agreements “do not indicate that
they were signed by the predecessor trustees in their representative capacity or that the
accounts were opened on behalf of a trust (which, incidentally, was purely a creature of
statute in this case).” Id. at 314.
378 Id. at 315.
367
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E. Presumption in Favor of Arbitration
Perhaps less a theory and more an underlying theme in most of the
cases described in this article is the strong state and federal public policy
favoring the enforcement of arbitration clauses. In 1987, in the first case
in which it sanctioned the arbitration of claims brought under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the Supreme Court of the United
States recognized that the FAA “establishes a ‘federal policy favoring
arbitration’ requiring that ‘we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.’”379 The Eddings court noted that “[a]rbitration proceedings are
so favored by Texas law that both our Constitution and statutes provide
for the submission of differences to arbitration.”380 The Smith court
spoke of a “presumption favoring arbitration” and noted that “[c]ourts
should not permit creative legal theories to undermine this
presumption.”381
In Blumenkrantz, the presumption in favor of arbitration caused
the court to determine that the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empted a
state law that arguably restricted the resolution of certain disputes to a
judicial forum.382 As described earlier, the trustee in this case had delegated its investment function to an investment adviser and signed an
account agreement that contained an arbitration provision.383 The beneficiary, a nonsignatory to the agreement, contended that she was not
bound by the arbitration provision, and further that the New York law
required that all disputes between the trustee and the investment adviser be resolved in a judicial forum.384 The New York Surrogate’s
Court began by examining the purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act
as articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States:
In creating a substantive rule applicable to state and federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. The basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act
is to overcome the courts’ refusals to enforce agreements to
arbitrate.385
379 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (citations
omitted) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 420 U.S. 1, 24
(1983); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
380 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Eddings, 838 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Tex. App.
1992).
381 Smith v. Multi-Fin. Sec. Corp., 171 P.3d 1267, 1270 (Colo. App. 2007).
382 In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (Sur. Ct. 2006).
383 Id. at 886.
384 Id.
385 Id. at 887 (citations omitted) (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16
(1984); Allied–Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995)).
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The court then noted that its interpretation of the delegation statute
should be “harmonized” with the federal law and with New York’s
strong public policy favoring arbitration.386 The court concluded that the
delegation statute did not prevent trustees from being bound by an
agreement to arbitrate.387 The court then went on to discuss why this
same policy also favored binding nonsignatory beneficiaries to the
agreement, noting that “if the beneficiary of the trust could bring suit
independently of the trustee and thereby avoid the arbitration clause,
the strong state policy favoring arbitration would be thwarted.”388
The presumption in favor of arbitration is so strong that “any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration.”389 Thus, “[a]n order to arbitrate the particular
grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation
that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
coverage.”390 In the French case, the court could not say with “positive
assurance” that the Wachovia arbitration agreement did not cover the
claims against the Wachovia affiliates, so it compelled the beneficiaries
to arbitrate those claims.391
IV. ENFORCEABILITY OF TRUSTEE PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS – THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
As the cases described above indicate, absent an unanticipated
about-face on the part of many of the courts or aggressive action by the
SEC or Congress, it appears that, for the most part, trustees’ predispute
arbitration agreements in contracts with financial services institutions
will be enforced against trust beneficiaries. This part explains, first, why
the reasoning in the few cases in which the courts have not compelled
arbitration is flawed and probably will not be persuasive to other courts.
Second, this part explores the contours of a typical securities arbitration
and the potential advantages and disadvantages to trust beneficiaries
(and others) if predispute arbitration agreements are enforced.
A. Flaws in the Cases That Do Not Compel Arbitration
The decisions of the courts that have refused to compel nonsignatory beneficiaries to abide by arbitration agreements signed by
386

Id.
Id. at 888.
388 Id.
389 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
390 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
391 French v. Wachovia Bank, No. 06-C-869, 2007 WL 895820, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Oct.
20, 2011).
387
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their trustees, while they may reach an appealing result for trust beneficiaries generally, do not appear to be based in solid legal theory.
The Clark court’s decision rests on two weak premises. The first is
that a beneficiary cannot be held to an agreement of which he had no
knowledge.392 The Clark decision does not indicate whether the trustee
was required to give annual accountings to the beneficiary. The court
assumed the truth of the beneficiary’s assertion that he had no knowledge that the trust account had been moved to Merrill Lynch until over
three years after the successor trustee had moved the account.393 The
beneficiary evidently did not try to gain any information about the status of the trust until that point in time, which was the date when his
mother died and his interest vested in possession. (Even then, it took
several months before he was given the information that he sought.)
Most likely the beneficiary could assert claims against the trustee for
failing to keep him reasonably informed as to the administration of the
trust. However, it would be a dangerous precedent to set if a trust beneficiary could avoid the provisions in contracts entered into by trustees
merely by denying knowledge of the details of those contracts. It is not a
stretch of the imagination to assume that most beneficiaries have little
or no knowledge of the details of many of the agreements entered into
by their trustees in the daily course of managing the trust assets. Yet this
does not prevent the trustees from following through on these agreements and binding the beneficiaries to them. Trustees generally are not
required to secure the agreement of beneficiaries for such matters as
where to deposit trust funds and which broker to use.394 Trust beneficiaries often have no concept of the details of the agreements relating to
these choices until they enter into litigation. That fact should not preclude the agreements from being binding on them, but rather should
only give them grounds to hold the trustee liable for the harm caused to
them by the contracts and by the trustees’ failure to keep the beneficiaries reasonably informed.
The second theory used in the Clark case appears to be an attempted “end run” around the estoppel theory. This is the court’s theory
that Merrill Lynch owed the beneficiaries fiduciary duties that were not
grounded in the account agreement.395 Their approach is troublesome
because, absent the account relationship, there is no context in which
these duties could arise. The beneficiary in Clark listed concrete examples of Merrill Lynch breaching its “duty of reasonable care to protect
his interests in the Trust from unreasonable risk of harm and to protect
392
393
394
395

Clark v. Clark, 57 P.3d 95, 98 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).
Id. at 96.
Id. at 96, 98-99.
Id. at 98.
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the Trust corpus.”396 These included setting up a margin account, giving
the trustee check-writing privileges, and issuing a debit card and a Visa
card that allowed him to withdraw money from a trust that was only
supposed to make one pre-established payment per month.397 The beneficiary also argued that Merrill Lynch should have noted the “rapid dissipation of funds from the account and that many of the payments were
obviously personal in nature to Trustee.”398 The question of the liability
of a financial services institution in this set of circumstances is a broad
one that is beyond the scope of this article. The problem in the Clark
decision is not that the court thought Merrill Lynch had some duty to
the beneficiaries, but rather that the court thought that duty somehow
arose outside of the context of the account agreement. There are numerous situations recognized by the law in which a fiduciary duty
arises,399 and some courts have held that even broker-dealers owe fiduciary duties to their customers.400 However, in order for a fiduciary duty
to exist, there must be a relationship of some sort between the parties.
The Clark court insisted on finding the existence of a fiduciary duty
outside of the relationship that was grounded in the account agreement,
but described no other relationship from which that duty could arise.401
As noted by the Smith court in its discussion of the Clark decision, “The
only factual allegations connecting the investment company to this trust
and these beneficiaries are the allegations that the investment company
maintained an account owned by the trust, and [the trustee] signed the
account agreements both as the investment company’s representative
and as trustee of the trust.”402
The Schmitz court’s opinion is flawed in that it neglects to consider
estoppel theory, relying primarily on the theory that the trustee is not
the beneficiaries’ agent and the beneficiary is not a third party beneficiary of the account agreement.403 Even if both of these findings are correct, estoppel theory cannot be simply ignored. The Besser case suffers
from the same weakness.404
396

Id.
Id.
398 Id.
399 See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879, 908. These include the following relationships: trustee-beneficiary, agent-principal, director-corporation, guardian-ward, lawyer-client, and
partners in a partnership. Id.
400 See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
401 Clark v. Clark, 57 P.3d 95, 98 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002). No other relationship can
be found. Id.
402 Smith v. Multi-Fin. Sec. Corp., 171 P.3d 1267, 1273 (Colo. App. 2007).
403 See Schmitz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 939 N.E.2d 40, 45 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2010).
404 See Besser v. Miller, 785 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div. 2004).
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The Halliday case also does not stand on solid ground. This court
did not consider equitable estoppel theory either.405 This may stem from
the fact that Morgan Stanley, in its original prayer to compel arbitration,
did not raise the theory but contended only that the trust beneficiary
was a third party beneficiary to the account agreement.406 Whatever the
reason, the decision is flawed by the lack of discussion of this fundamental theory. Additionally, the court’s third party beneficiary discussion
revolves around a surmise by the court that the account agreement was
primarily for the benefit of the trustees. Without any apparent underlying evidence, the court paints the picture of unsophisticated trustees
(family members) who are probably “untrained or inexperienced in
managing such assets” and who mistakenly believe that they can “lessen
their personal culpability for mismanagement” by “throw[ing] off the
liability to someone else.”407 Even if the court’s characterization of the
trustees were a correct one, the court neglects to consider that these are
exactly the type of trustees who should engage the services of professional money managers rather than muddling through the trust administration on their own.408 If the court had concrete evidence that the
trustee entered into the accounts for his own personal benefit, the court
perhaps could have found this to be a violation of the trustee’s duty of
loyalty to the beneficiaries. UTC section 802 requires a trustee to administer a trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries409 and allows a
beneficiary to void a “transaction affecting the investment or management of trust property entered into by the trustee for the trustee’s own
personal account or which is otherwise affected by a conflict between
the trustee’s fiduciary and personal interests.”410 While this argument
may be initially appealing, it depends upon the court finding an actual
conflict of interest on the part of the trustee when he entered into the
account agreement, which surely would not appear on the face of the
account agreement and most likely would not be supported by extrinsic
evidence.
405

See Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Halliday, 873 So. 2d 400, 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2004).
406

Id. at 402.
Id. at 405.
408 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 cmt. b (2014). Comment (b) to section seventy-seven of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts notes that an element of a trustee’s duty of prudent administration is to obtain competent guidance and assistance in
matters that are outside the realm of the trustee’s skills and expertise. Id.
409 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 (a) (2010). This duty is also expressed in UPIA § 5.
UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 5 (1994).
410 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 (b). However, a beneficiary cannot void a transaction if
the transaction was authorized by the terms of the trust. Id. § 802 (b)(1). As most trusts
grant trustees broad administrative and investment powers, it would be difficult to argue
that the account agreement was not authorized. Id.
407
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The reliance by the Halliday court on the fact that the trustee is not
the agent of the beneficiary is flawed in that the agency theory about
which this court was so concerned is a theory that relates to whether a
beneficiary is personally liable on contracts entered into by the trustee.
Although never mentioning the case, the Halliday court seems to have
adopted the theory of Comer v. Micor, Inc. that binding the beneficiaries to arbitration subjects them to personal liability rather than to
liability that relates solely to the trust property.411 This court focuses
strongly on the beneficiary’s “waiver of her right to access to a court to
seek redress for loss” and seemed to equate this waiver to “personal
liability.”412 To the extent the predispute arbitration agreement creates
a “liability” for the beneficiary, the liability is not one that is “personal”
but rather one that relates directly to the trust property and the beneficiary’s ability to pursue claims for loss in the value of that property.
B. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Forced Arbitration
The focus on the beneficiary’s loss of the right of access to the court
is a compelling theme for those courts that refuse to enforce predispute
arbitration agreements. Thus, it is important to examine exactly what a
trust beneficiary “wins” or “loses” when compelled to arbitrate. This
section explores two components of that debate – cost and fairness –
and also examines whether the arbitration of these disputes has other
undesirable effects on the development of trust and securities law.
The claims raised in the cases described in this article fall roughly
into two categories. The first category is comprised of those situations in
which the beneficiary is complaining about a loss in the value of the
trust assets due to investment decisions made by the trustee in conjunction with the financial services institution. For example, in the Gardner
case, the trust assets declined substantially in value.413 The beneficiary
sued the trustee for making imprudent investments and for failing to
diversify the trust asset and sued First Union for negligence in that it
had not “exercise[d] reasonable care in investing the assets.”414 In Ventura, the beneficiary had already been awarded a judgment against his
mother for improper handling and investment of the trust assets but
then pursued actions against the brokerage firms, alleging they collaborated with his mother in the investments that depleted his account.415 In
411 See Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Halliday, 873 So. 2d 400, 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004); supra text accompanying notes 202-09. See generally Laby, supra note 17, at 711.
412 See Halliday, 873 So. 2d at 403.
413 In re Jean F. Gardner Amended Blind Trust, 70 P.3d 168, 169 (Wash. Ct. App.
2003).
414 Id. at 170.
415 Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Ventura, 907 So. 2d 1035, 1037-38 (Ala. 2005).
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Blumenkrantz, the beneficiary alleged that inappropriate investing had
led to a fifty percent reduction in the value of the trust assets.416 In
Green, the beneficiary alleged that the brokerage firm and the bank had
negligently handled the trust funds when she discovered that the trust
assets had been substantially depleted.417 In Smith, the beneficiary complained that the investment company had recommended disbursements
that were unsuitable for the account.418 The claims raised in Halliday
related to whether the investments were structured to balance the interest of the income beneficiary against those of the remainder beneficiaries (who also happened to be the trustees).419 These claims may
prompt the trust beneficiaries to sue both the trustee (for negligence in
overseeing or managing the investments) and the financial services institution. Quite often in these cases, the resolution of the claim against the
financial services institution will also resolve the claim against the trustee. For example, in a situation such as that in Blumenkrantz, if the decline in value of the trust assets is found to be due to the vagaries of the
market rather than inappropriate investing, both the trustee and the financial services institution are relieved from liability.420
Claims that fall in the second category are those directed towards
the actions of the trustee that are independent of the investment advice
given by the brokers or advisers. These include breach of fiduciary duty,
malfeasance, making inappropriate distributions, and in some cases,
what amounts to outright stealing of the trust assets. In Green, the dissipation of the trust assets from three hundred thousand to two thousand dollars was most likely due to more than mere poor investments
made by the trustee.421 In Clark, the trustee made repeated, unauthorized withdrawals, depleting the trust assets to forty-three dollars.422 In
Halliday, there is some question as to whether the trustees, who were
also the remainder beneficiaries, were manipulating the trust investments so as to make sure the remainder grew for their benefit at the
expense of earning trust income for the income beneficiary.423 In Smith,
the trustee’s dual role as trustee and representative of the financial ser416

In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (Sur. Ct. 2006).
Green v. Regions Bank, No. 2013 CA 0771, 2014 WL 3555820, at *1-2 (La. Ct.
App. Mar. 19, 2014).
418 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Eddings, 838 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. App.
1992).
419 Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Halliday, 873 So. 2d 400, 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
420 In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
421 Green, 2014 WL 3555820, at *1.
422 Clark v. Clark, 57 P.3d 95, 96 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).
423 Halliday, 873 So. 2d at 403.
417

334

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:273

vices company raised serious conflict of interest problems.424 In
Schmitz, the second wife used her authority as trustee to make unauthorized withdrawals and deplete the trust assets substantially.425 In Warren, the trustee, with the alleged assistance of two employees of Morgan
Keegan, diverted over eight hundred thousand of the one million dollar
trust for his own use and personal benefit.426 In all of these cases, the
fact that the beneficiaries may be compelled to arbitrate their claims
against the financial services institutions should not directly affect their
underlying claims against the trustee. These claims against the trustee
remain intact. However, the arbitration may have two negative effects
from the beneficiaries’ standpoint. The first is the direct effect of delaying the lawsuit and adding another layer to the litigation. Unfortunately
for the beneficiaries, the Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that bifurcated litigation is an undesirable but necessary consequence of the strong presumption in favor of arbitration.427 The second
possible negative effect is that the beneficiaries who joined the financial
services institutions in the lawsuits may have lost access to those “deep
pockets,” at least for purposes of the underlying lawsuit. While undesirable, neither of these negative effects can be categorized as a “loss” to
the beneficiaries of their “right of access to the courts.”428 The trustee
too may be negatively affected by this bifurcation of the proceedings.
An example of this problem arose in the Gardner case in which the trustee argued unsuccessfully that arbitration would deny him his right to
obtain contribution from the financial services institution because the
institution would argue that any determination of fault made at trial
could not be enforced against it because it was not a party to the
lawsuit.429
Undeniably, however, the claims that relate directly to alleged improper investments will not be tried in a court but rather will be heard
by an arbitrator or arbitration panel. The beneficiaries who fought so
hard to keep these claims out of arbitration seemed to assume that they
would fare less well in arbitration than in court. This is not surprising in
that a recent study (which will be referred to herein as the “Gross/Black
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Smith v. Multi-Fin. Sec. Corp., 171 P.3d 1267, 1269-70 (Colo. App. 2007).
Schmitz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 939 N.E.2d 40, 42 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2010).
426 Warren v. Geller, No. 11-2282, 2014 WL 4186482, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2014).
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(Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460
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Study”) indicates that, by and large, investors perceive that securities
arbitration is unfair.430
The advantages and disadvantages of securities arbitration have
been debated at length by scholars, policy makers, industry analysts, and
other commentators, and this article will not rehash those discussions.
Instead, this section examines two major issues that are of concern to
those trust beneficiaries who are facing mandatory arbitration: cost and
fairness. The questions whether arbitration in general is more or less
costly or more or less “fair” than litigation cannot be answered definitively in that arbitrations may take place with many different rules and
in many different fora. However, as was discussed earlier, most of the
arbitrations that are at issue in the cases examined herein will take place
under the umbrella of the FINRA dispute resolution system.431 Thus
these questions can be examined more precisely through the FINRA
lens.
1. Cost
In the context of a FINRA arbitration, the first element of the cost
assessment is the arbitration fees. FINRA charges an initial filing fee for
a customer who files a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party
claim. The fee is based on the amount of the claim and ranges from fifty
dollars for claims of up to one thousand dollars, seventy-five dollars on
claims of between one thousand and twenty-five hundred dollars, and to
two thousand dollars for claims above one million dollars.432 The initial
customer filing fee may be deferred in whole or in part for financial
hardship.433 A brokerage firm that files a claim or is named as a party to
a claim must pay a substantially higher fee (the “member surcharge
fee”), the amount of which is also based on the size of the claim. The
member surcharge fees range from $150 for claims of up to five thousand dollars, $3025 for claims of between one and five million dollars,
and to $4025 for claims over ten million dollars.434 The broker must also
pay fees when the list of arbitrators is sent out and when FINRA notifies the parties of the date and place of the hearing.435
430 Jill Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Emprical
Study of Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL.
349, 350, 390- 91, 400.
431 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
432 FINRA Rule 12900 (Dec. 15, 2014).
433 Id.
434 FINRA Rule 12901 (Dec. 15, 2014).
435 Summary of Arbitration Fees, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/summary-arbitration-fees (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
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In addition to these filing fees, FINRA charges the parties a fee for
each hearing session.436 A hearing session is “any meeting between the
parties and arbitrator(s) of four hours or less, including a hearing or a
prehearing conference.”437 This fee also is based on the size of the
claim, ranging from fifty dollars per session with one arbitrator for
claims less than twenty-five hundred dollars, to $450 per session with
one arbitrator for claims of over ten thousand dollars.438 For hearing
sessions with a panel of three arbitrators, the hearing fees range from six
hundred dollars per session for claims of between twenty-five thousand
and fifty thousand dollars, to thirteen hundred dollars for claims of between five hundred thousand and one million dollars.439 “The average
arbitration requires three days of hearings.”440 FINRA may charge additional fees, including fees for injunctive claim relief, discovery motions, and adjournment fees.441 Most of these fees are allocated between
or among the parties by the arbitrators.442
Another crucial cost factor is the fees that the parties pay their attorneys.443 Both a court hearing and an arbitration hearing will typically
436

Id.
Dispute Resolution Glossary, FINRA http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/dispute-resolution-glossary (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
438 FINRA Rule 12902 (Dec. 15, 2014).
439 Id.
440 Seth Lipner, Is Arbitration Really Cheaper?, FORBES (July 14, 2009, 2:00 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/14/lipner-arbitration-litigation-intelligent-investingcost.html. Obviously the more complicated the issues, the more time will be devoted to
hearings by the arbitration panels. Compare the Tobel arbitration (described supra at
text accompanying notes 177-84), which incurred total hearing session fees of eighteen
thousand dollars after one pre-hearing conference and seven days of hearings, with the
Ventura arbitration (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 108-24), which incurred
total hearing session fees of $10,800 after two pre-hearing conferences and three and a
half hearing days. In the Eddings arbitration (discussed supra at text accompanying notes
86-95), the NYSE “forum fees” amounted to $31,800 after ten and a half hearing days.
441 Summary of Arbitration Fees, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/summary-arbitration-fees (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
442 For example, in the Tobel arbitration (described supra at text accompanying
notes 177-84), the arbitration panel divided the hearing session fees equally among the
claimants, the brokerage firm, and the insurance company. In the Ventura arbitration
(discussed supra at text accompanying notes 108-24), the arbitration panel assessed the
entire amount of the hearing session fees against the brokerage firm. In the Eddings
arbitration (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 86-95), the NYSE “forum fees”
were divided equally between the parties.
443 Investor Advocacy Clinic Program, FINRA INVESTOR EDUCATION FOUNDATION,
http://www.finrafoundation.org/grants/advocacy/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). In 2009, the
FINRA Investor Education Foundation launched a program to provide start-up assistance to law schools to establish clinics that supervise law students handling the cases of
investors of moderate means at little or no cost to the investor. Id. The Foundation has to
date awarded grants to the following schools: Florida International University College of
Law, Howard University School of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, Suffolk
437
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involve the employment of attorneys to represent the parties. Although
a party is not required to have an attorney in a FINRA arbitration, at
least one study has shown that customers in securities arbitration who
are represented by an attorney have a much higher chancing of winning
their cases than those who proceed pro se.444 Assuming that attorneys
are employed both for judicial and arbitration proceedings and that attorneys are typically paid by the hour, the relative costs of the two
processes becomes dependent upon the length of time involved. FINRA
reports that the average overall turn-around time for an arbitration that
involves a hearing is about seventeen and a half months.445 It is extraordinarily difficult to state an “average” time for a civil lawsuit, but factors
such as motions practice, extended discovery, depositions, etc. – factors
that are not present in a typical arbitration – result often in prolonged
trial-level proceedings far beyond seventeen and a half months.446
As noted earlier, if the trust beneficiary has claims against both the
trustee and the financial services firm, the original proceedings may be
bifurcated between those claims against the trustee, which will be tried
in court, and those claims against the financial services company, which
will be arbitrated.447 While the arbitration proceedings may be relatively
short, the overall process may take equally as long if not longer and thus
be more costly. Also relevant to the issue of cost is the fact that arbitration awards are generally not appealable. Thus, when comparing a typical arbitration to a typical legal proceeding, time and associated cost of
an appeal in a judicial proceeding must be factored in.

University Law School, Seton Hall University School of Law, University of Miami School
of Law, Georgia State University College of Law, and Michigan State University College
of Law. Awarded Grants: Investor Advocacy Clinic Program, FINRA INVESTOR EDUCATION FOUNDATION, http://www.finrafoundation.org/grants/awarded/advocacy/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
444 Howard B. Prossnitz, Who Wins FINRA Cases and Why? An Empirical Analysis,
19 PIABA B. J. 141 (No. 2 2012).
445 Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/dispute-resolution-statistics (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
446 The National Center for State Courts’ Civil Litigation Cost Model presents an
interesting quantification of attorney’s and expert witness fees in “typical” cases, such as
automobile tort cases, professional malpractice cases and breach of contract cases. Paula
Hannaford-Agor & Nicole A. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, COURTSTATISTICS.ORG, Jan. 2013, at 2 tbl.1, available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/
microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csph_online2.ashx. The current model shows average litigation costs for an automobile tort case as forty-three thousand dollars, for a professional
malpractice case as $122,000, and for a breach of contract case as ninety-one thousand
dollars. Id. The bulk of the attorney time in each of these cases is spent at trial. Id. The
second most time-consuming activity is discovery. Id.
447 See supra Part IV.B.
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2. Fairness
As noted earlier, investors are skeptical of the overall fairness of a
securities arbitration proceeding.448 This subpart examines and discusses
possible sources of this perception.
a. Arbitration Favors the “Big Guys” over the “Little Guys”
Professor Jean Sternlight has written eloquently in favor of arbitration fairness acts, arguing that U.S. companies are increasingly using
mandatory arbitration to the disadvantage of the “little guys,” whom she
defines as their employees and consumers.449 No doubt trust beneficiaries facing arbitration against major financial services institutions picture themselves as the “little guys” being thrown into the den of the “big
guys.” The latest FINRA data on the results of FINRA arbitration offers mixed evidence as to whether this perception is accurate. From
2009-2014, customers were awarded damages in about forty-two to
forty-seven percent of arbitrated cases.450 A recent study broke down
this data based on the size of the claim and the size of the responding
firm.451 The study concluded that the smallest claims were those that
received the highest percentage recovery.452 “The greatest difference in
percentage of relief received is between Claimants who were asking for
less than $25,000 and received an average 74.6% of their request,
whereas those asking for more than $500,000 received only 36.6% of
their requests.”453 Over forty-five percent of those who filed claims of
448

See supra Part I.B.
Jean R. Sternlight, Fixing the Mandatory Arbitration Problem: We Need The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, U NEV. SCHOLARLY WORKS (2009), http://scholars.law
.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1880&context=facpub.
450 Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/dispute-resolution-statistics. This statistic may be misleading in that even awards as
small as one dollar are included in the calculation. Id.
451 Prossnitz, supra note 444.
452 Id. at 149.
453 Id. The study posited some possible reasons for this disparity, including the fact
that
cases seeking larger amounts are more likely to have inflated damage requests.
Claimants can ask for large emotional or punitive damages in addition to out of
pocket losses sustained. Some Claimants’ lawyers routinely ask for punitive
damages in an amount equal to or greater than the compensatory damages. Another reason to expect a higher percentage recovery in smaller cases is that
Claimants who ask for less money may have a simpler case to prove. Many of
the cases seeking less than $25,000 ask only for compensatory damages and no
soft damages. Further, an arbitration panel may be more hesitant to give out
100% of the request for a large award than to give 100% of the request for a
small award.
Id.
449
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fifty thousand dollars or less (which are handled by FINRA under the
“simplified claims process” using one arbitrator)454 received one hundred percent of the amount they requested, as opposed to about twelve
percent of those with larger claims.455 This would seem to indicate that
the “littlest guys” fare best in FINRA arbitrations.456 On the other
hand, a statistic that examines success rates on the basis of the size of
the respondent shows that the larger the brokerage firm, the more likely
the claimant will lose.457 “Claimants won 51.9% more often when disputing cases against the smallest firms compared to when they faced
firms in the top 12 category.”458 In addition, the large firms were more
successful in limiting the recovery rate once an award had been entered
against them.459 “The estimated recovery rate against large firms was
only 12.4% versus 22.1% against smaller brokerage firms.”460 This puzzling array of data does not bode well for the trust beneficiaries in the
cases described in this article, as most of the claims for which dollar
amounts were disclosed were over fifty thousand dollars and most of the
respondents were major brokerage firms.
b. Arbitrator Bias
The parties’ ability to choose who will arbitrate their cases has
often been touted as a major advantage of arbitration over litigation.
The theory is that the parties are able to choose arbitrators who have
experience in the field and thus are better able to analyze the cases
before them than a judge who manages a docket that includes not only
investor complaints but everything ranging from personal injury claims
to murder. However, the choice of arbitrators in securities arbitration
cases has not increased public confidence in the fairness of arbitration
but rather has had the opposite effect of decreasing it. The Gross/Black
Study found that “investors have a strong negative perception of the
454 Simplified Arbitrations, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/
simplified-arbitrations (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
455 Prossnitz, supra note 444, at 149.
456 See id. It should also be kept in mind that those investors with the smallest claims
are the ones who are eligible for the low cost or free representation provided for by the
law school clinics. Awarded Grants: Investor Advocacy Clinic Program, FINRA INVESTOR EDUCATION FOUNDATION, http://www.finrafoundation.org/grants/awarded/advocacy/.
457 Prossnitz, supra note 444, at 160.
458 Id. While the argument may be made that the larger firms are able to afford the
“better” attorneys, the study also found that “in terms of whether Claimants achieve a
win, it does not matter much whether a Respondent is represented by a small law firm,
large firm, or in house counsel.” Id. at 158.
459 Id.
460 Id. In this regard, the size of the brokerage firm’s law firm does seem to matter.
Id. “In terms of containing damages, however, large [law] firms do better.” Id.
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bias of arbitrators in the securities arbitration forum.”461 This perception may rest on the assumption that, because the arbitration is controlled by FINRA, FINRA arbitrators would be “industry arbitrators” –
that is, individuals who would have strong ties to (and thus, tend to
favor) the securities industry. FINRA does not use the term “industry
arbitrator” but rather “has two classifications of arbitrators: public and
non-public. Public arbitrators are select individuals who are not required to have knowledge of the securities industry. Non-public arbitrators have a more extensive securities industry background.”462 Prior to
2011, FINRA arbitration panels for claims of one hundred thousand
dollars or more consisted of three arbitrators: one public arbitrator, one
non-public arbitrator, and a public arbitrator chairperson.463 In 2011,
the SEC approved a change in the FINRA rules to allow customers with
claims of one hundred thousand dollars or more to choose the option of
having a panel composed completely of public arbitrators.464 A study
published in 2013 showed that customers were successful in their arbitrations with all-public panels sixty-two percent of the time, compared
to a forty-four percent success rate with mixed panels.465 The study author stated, “A 62% success rate puts FINRA awards much more in line
with the overall results in state court bench and jury trials in non-securities cases. According to a U.S. Department of Justice study, plaintiffs
won in almost 60% of trials overall.”466 Thus, to the degree that these
early statistics indicate positive trends, it would seem that customers and
trust beneficiaries who are compelled to a FINRA arbitration and who
choose the “all-public option” may receive as “fair” a hearing from the
arbitration panel as they could in a court of law.467
c. Unexplained Decisions
One other reason why some may perceive the arbitration process as
unfair relates to the fact that generally arbitrators are not required to
461

Gross & Black, supra note 430, at 350.
FINRA Arbitrators, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/
finra-arbitrators (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
463 FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 11-05: ARBITRATION PANEL COMPOSITION 6 n.2
(February 1, 2011), available at http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/
p122879.pdf. For claims under fifty thousand dollars, under the “simplified claims procedure,” FINRA chooses one arbitrator. Simplified Arbitrations, FINRA, http://www.finra
.org/arbitration-and-mediation/simplified-arbitrations (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
464 FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 11-05, supra note 463.
465 Prossnitz, supra note 444, at 151.
466 Id., at 152 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ NO. 223851, SPECIAL REPORT: CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 (rev. 2009), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf).
467 But see Warach, supra note 36, at 128 (arguing that the rule change will have little
impact on the overall fairness of enforcing predispute arbitration agreements).
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explain the reasons for their decisions. Thus, there may be little oversight to keep these arbitrators from making decisions that have no
grounding in current applicable law let alone in principles of equity and
fairness. The accuracy of this perception can only be tested by careful
examination of the statistics described above.
An additional and perhaps more harmful result of the lack of explained decisions is that those who engage in securities arbitration are
denied the opportunity to understand what legal precedents should be
controlling the outcomes of their cases. This is also a loss to the general
public in that development and the evolution of theories in this area of
the law cannot occur when decisions are made under a shroud of
secrecy.
The cases discussed in this article raise significant issues relating to
the administration, management and investment of trust funds. An overriding question that needs judicial examination is the scope of the duties
that financial services institutions owe to the trusts, trustees, and trust
beneficiaries whom they serve. Some of the cases described earlier raise
the question of whether a broker or investment adviser owes a duty
when investing the assets of a trust that is different from the duty owed
when investing the assets of an individual customer. For example in the
Ventura case, the beneficiary claimed that the brokerage firm either
lacked the knowledge to understand what types of investments were
suitable for the particular type of trust in question or misrepresented its
knowledge to the trustee.468 The plaintiffs’ claims in Halliday and
Schmitz imply that a financial services institution that is hired by a trustee is under a duty to read the trust instrument and to make efforts to
ensure that the trustee does not act in violation of that instrument.469
Other cases raise the issue of who is liable when the trust investments
underperform: is it the brokerage firm who advised the trustee or is the
trustee independently liable to make sure that the investments are prudent and appropriate to the needs of the trust beneficiaries? The Gardner and Blumenkrantz cases left unanswered the question of whether a
financial services institution is liable to trust beneficiaries for investment
decisions that cause the trust assets to depreciate substantially in
value.470 Because these cases were forced into arbitration, the general
public is not given the benefit of judicial exploration of these important
issues.
468

Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Ventura, 907 So. 2d 1035, 1039 (Ala. 2005).
See Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Halliday, 873 So. 2d 400, 403-04 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004); Schmitz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 939 N.E.2d 40, 45 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2010).
470 See In re Jean F. Gardner Amended Blind Trust, 70 P.3d 168, 170 (Wash. Ct. App.
2003); In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d 884, 888 (Sur. Ct. 2006).
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POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

This author has grappled with the issues that arise when trust beneficiaries are bound by predispute arbitration agreements and has not
been very successful in coming up with possible workable solutions. The
major difficulties in binding beneficiaries to these agreements arise in
those cases in which there are claims against both the trustee and the
financial securities institution. Forcing a beneficiary to arbitration may
prolong the litigation if the beneficiary must proceed on two fronts: in
arbitration with the institution and then in litigation with the trustee.
Thus, while most dispute resolution mechanisms are meant to make resolution less costly and more efficient, arbitration in this type of case has
the opposite effect. Also, when these cases go to arbitration, there is a
good possibility that FINRA arbitrators, while having a great deal of
familiarity with securities issues, will not be schooled enough in trust law
to appreciate the unique types of claims that the beneficiaries may
bring. For example, a FINRA arbitrator might not be aware of the type
of investing required to balance the potentially competing interests of
income and remainder beneficiaries, a question that was at issue in the
Halliday case.471 FINRA arbitrators may not appreciate the significance
of the financial services institution giving check-writing and debit card
privileges to a trustee who is only supposed to make one disbursement a
month according to the trust terms, as happened in the Clark case.472
Nor may they comprehend the danger when an investment adviser
falsely convinces a conservator that he or she has knowledge about
which investments are appropriate for a conservatorship, as was alleged
in Ventura,473 or the unique disbursement requirements of special needs
trusts that were at issue in Green.474
The decision to prohibit predispute arbitration agreements entirely
in all brokerage and investment adviser account agreements is in the
hands of the SEC and Congress. Assuming no such action on their parts,
this author has considered (and rejected) two other possible solutions:
(1) prohibiting trustees from signing predispute arbitration agreements
and (2) characterizing the signing of such an agreement as a breach of
the trustee’s fiduciary duty. These solutions are neither practical nor in
keeping with prevailing trust law. It is not practical to prohibit trustees
from signing such agreements because they currently appear in virtually
every account agreement contract. Trustees, particularly trustees of
small trusts, have very little negotiating power and thus will be unable to
471

See Halliday, 873 So. 2d at 403.
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473 Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Ventura, 907 So. 2d 1035, 1037-38 (Ala. 2005).
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have the arbitration provision removed from the account agreement.
Furthermore, even if they search for alternatives, trustees will be hardpressed to find any institution that does not include a predispute arbitration clause in their standard contracts. Labeling the signing of such an
agreement as a breach of fiduciary duty would contradict the investment
standard set forth in the UPIA, which, as discussed above, holds a trustee to the same standard as other “prudent investors.”475 Because account agreements with predispute arbitration provisions are the norm in
the industry, most “prudent investors” are also subject to them. Discouraging a trustee from signing such an agreement would have the undesirable result of encouraging the trustee to proceed on his or her own,
without the benefit of a brokerage firm or an investment adviser. Many
individuals do not have the financial experience or sophistication to
choose and manage appropriate investments. The “prudent” individuals
employ financial services institutions to assist them. The negative effects
of prohibiting or discouraging trustees from taking this same route could
far outweigh the negative consequences of enforcing arbitration clauses
against beneficiaries.
Another solution that this author has considered relates to the
Clark court’s insistence that the beneficiary could not be bound to the
predispute arbitration agreement because he had no knowledge that the
trustee had moved the account to Merrill Lynch, nor that he had signed
such an agreement.476 Is it feasible to require a trustee who plans to
enter into such an agreement to notify the beneficiaries in advance and
give them a chance to object? Or, alternatively, should the securities law
give trust beneficiaries a short period of time (e.g., five days) to rescind
account agreements signed by trustees that contain predispute arbitration agreements? These possible solutions fail under the same logic that
is described immediately above: predispute arbitration agreements are
so ubiquitous that, even if the beneficiaries object, the chances are remote that the trustee will be able to find another quality financial services institution that does not include the same provision in its account
agreement.
This author has also considered (and rejected) the possibility that
cases in which the trust beneficiaries are suing both the trustee and the
financial services institution should be allowed to proceed to trial while
those suits in which the trust beneficiaries are suing only the financial
services institution should be ordered to arbitration. While superficially
attractive, this approach may bring about more problems than it solves.
As the cases and studies described in this article indicate, trust beneficiaries are loathe to have their cases sent to arbitration. A rule of this
475
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sort would invite and perhaps even incite them to join the trustee in the
lawsuit even if the trustee has not done anything wrong. This, in turn,
would prompt the prudent trustee to hire his or her own attorney. The
financial services institution would probably initiate a court action to
determine whether the joining of the trustee is merely a ruse to avoid
arbitration. If the lawsuit against both the trustee and the financial services institution were to be allowed to continue, it would inevitably become more complicated and thus require an additional investment of
court resources. And if in the end the trustee is absolved from liability,
the trustee’s attorney’s fees would be payable from the trust funds.
The only possible approach to resolution this author has not rejected completely would involve changing the FINRA rules as to the
choice of arbitrators in certain cases. Cases that involve an intertwining
of claims against the trustee and claims against the financial services
institution have a unique dimension that is not present in those cases
that focus solely on the management and investment activities of the
financial services institution. In these cases, it may be appropriate that
the public arbitrator chairperson who is chosen by FINRA, or perhaps
all of the arbitrators who are on the selection lists that are sent to the
parties, be required to have an extensive background in trust law so that
the subtleties of the trust-related claims are not lost in the course of the
arbitration. Professional organizations such as the American College of
Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC)477 would be a ready source of such
individuals. Such individuals would also be required to undergo the
same mandatory training that is required of all FINRA arbitrators. The
realization by beneficiaries that they are not being thrown into an environment that is insensitive to their special claims may boost their confidence in the arbitration process. Additionally, in some of these cases the
arbitration may have the added advantages of resolving so many of the
trust claims that the need to pursue an additional court proceeding may
not be necessary.
The proposed solution does not resolve the problem of the lack of
case law and precedent on questions relating to what types of duties
broker-dealers and investment advisers owe to beneficiaries of trusts.
Even if the arbitrators in these cases were required to give explained
decisions, such decisions would probably fall short of the more reasoned
law-focused opinions that are delivered by appellate courts. This is an
area to which scholarly attention should be given. Optimistically, the
arbitrators’ work could be informed by such scholarship.
477 “The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel is a national organization of
approximately 2,600 lawyers elected to membership by demonstrating the highest level of
integrity, commitment to the profession, competence and experience as trust and estate
counselors.” Home, ACTEC, http://www.actec.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
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Meanwhile, the debate about predispute arbitration agreements
will continue on the SEC and Congressional levels. Unless and until that
debate results in a ban on predispute arbitration agreements, lawyers for
beneficiaries in most states should weigh carefully whether to spend client time and money resisting predispute arbitration clauses and instead
devote more energy and resources to managing the arbitration itself.

